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ABSTRACT
The thesis looks three pertinent issues in Housing Market and Urban Economics literature with
panel data- home sales and house price relationship, efficiency of housing market and commercial
property taxation. For the first part, I examine the strong positive correlation that exists between
the volume of housing sales and housing prices. I develop a simple model of these flows which
suggests they generate a negative price-to-sales relationship. This runs contrary to a different
literature on liquidity constraints and loss aversion. Our results from both are strong and robust.
Higher sales "Granger cause" higher prices, but higher prices "Granger cause" both lower sales and
a growing inventory of units-for-sale. These relationships together provide a more complete picture
of the housing market - suggesting the strong positive correlation in the data results from frequent
shifts in the negative price-to-sales schedule.
For the second part, I tested the hypothesis whether the housing market is efficient and whether
"bargains" can be found in the market or not. According to the User cost model, house price
appreciation is positively correlated to price. Nevertheless, such correlation between price and
appreciation can be caused by productivity differences, behavioral reasons or high transaction costs.
Using 4 unique sets of panel data at zip code level, I am able to test the efficiency hypothesis
without worrying about productivity reasons and transaction costs. In addition, I tested the
efficiency hypothesis by removing influences caused by changes in buyers' preferences over time.
The results show that appreciation and house price is positively correlated in San Diego, Boston and
Phoenix. However, appreciation and house price is negatively correlated in Chicago.
For the last part, I examine an unusual phenomenon in Massachusetts, where some municipals
impose a high property tax on commercial properties and low tax on residential properties. Unlike
past studies, we treat the tax on firms as an entrance fee or compensation for the negative
externalities the firms generate. This approach fits our context better because we are dealing with
municipals- most of the individuals don't work where they live, and the firms are unlikely to
provide them employment or other benefits. I develop a simple model to capture the firms' location
decision and residents' demand for services and aversion to firms. The model suggests that rich
neighborhoods tend to impose high commercial and residential property tax, as they try to reduce
their reliance on firms for services. In addition, the municipals will impose a high commercial
property tax rate if the number of firms in municipal is large. I assembled a panel data base
covering 351 municipals over a period from 1975-2007. The empirical results strongly support the
model, suggesting rich municipals rely less on firms.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Research in housing market at the macroeconomic level has been hindered by the
availability of data- the time series data for house price, income and sales volume are short. The
advent of panel data analysis has helped us overcome such problems, as long as we have had
sufficiently many observations for each cross-section. Yet, when we like to find the "granger
causality" between two variables using panel data, we are not able to get consistent estimates if we
use the usual fixed effects regression model. By construction, the lagged dependent variable is
correlated to the fixed effects. To correct such effects, Holtz-Eakin et al (1988) made use of the
historical values as instrumental variables. Arellano Bond (1991) further extended the techniques.
With such techniques at hand and the greater availability of data, we are able to better understand
the housing markets at the regional level. Not only can we test some the theories postulated in the
housing and urban economics literature, we can learn from the empirical results to come up with
new theories in understanding the housing market in U.S. My thesis uses these panel data and
techniques to explore three areas in the urban economics literature: a) the price and sales
relationship in housing markets , b) the relationship between commercial property taxes and wages
and employment at municipal level and c) the efficiency of housing market at the zip code level.
The first part of my thesis examines the co-movement between sales and prices in the
housing market. I first study the gross housing flows in U.S., which can be divided into two types-
owner-to-owner churn and sales involving changing of tenure. Much of the literature emphasizes
on the positive schedule between own-to -own sales and price, but the latter type of sales represent
the majority of sales. I developed a simple model of the flows and the model suggests that price
negatively affect price. The implication runs against the loss aversion and liquidity constraints
theory. We assemble two data sets and test our hypotheses of our model.
In the second part of my thesis, I study the efficiency of housing markets at zip code level.
According to the user cost model, the costs that a homeowner incurred from owning a house
includes the expected appreciation of house price. Hence, how much the home owner is willing to
pay depends on the expected appreciation. If the market is efficient, home owners will pay a high
(low) price for a housing unit with low (high) user costs and high (low) expected appreciation.
Empirically, we will observe high (low) price locations experiencing high (low) appreciation if the
market is efficient. Nevertheless, such persistent price dispersion could be caused by productivity
differences, high transaction costs and other behavioral reasons. We assemble a unique set of data
that traces changes in price at zip code level within the city, that allows us to examine price
dispersion without some of the problems in previous empirical studies.
For the final part of my thesis, I investigate why local municipals select property
classification for property tax purposes, and how and why the tax rates for different types of
properties differ using Massachusetts as a case study. From anecdotal evidence, we found that the
commercial property tax rates are usually set higher than residential tax rates. We look at how the
rates affect the employment and income of the municipal and in turn how the employment and
income affect the setting of property tax rates. With large number of municipals and the availability
of tax and economic data over 30 years, we are able to get some new results and contribute to the
housing and public finance literature.
The thesis will comprise of 5 chapters. I will dedicate a chapter for each of the three
research questions I proposed. Within each chapter, I will go through the motivation, the research
question, literature review, empirical strategy, and analysis of results. In the last chapter, I will
conclude with some ideas for future research in this field.
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Chapter 2 The Co-Movements of Housing Sales and House Price: Theory
and Empirics
2.1 Introduction.
As shown in Figure 1 below, there is a strong positive correlation between housing sales
(expressed as a percent of all owner households) and the movement in housing prices (R2=.66). On
the surface the relationship looks to be close to contemporaneous. There is also a somewhat less
obvious negative relationship between prices and the shorter series on the inventory of owner units
for sale (R2=.51). A number of authors have offered explanations for these relationships, in
particular that between prices and sales.
Figure 1:US Housing Sales, Prices, Inventory
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In one camp, there is a growing literature of models describing home owner "churn" in the presence
of search frictions [Wheaton (1990), Berkovec and Goodman (1996), Lundberg and Skedinger
(1999)]. In these models, buyers become sellers - there are no entrants or exits from the market. In
such a situation the role of prices is complicated by the fact that if participants pay higher prices,
they also receive more upon sale. It is the transaction cost of owning 2 homes (during the moving
period) that grounds prices. If prices are high, the transaction costs can make trading expensive
enough to erase the original gains from moving. In this environment Nash-bargained prices move
almost inversely to sales duration - equal to the vacant inventory divided by the sales flow. In these
models, both the inventory and sales chum are exogenous. Following Pissarides (2000) if the
matching rate is exogenous or alternatively of specific form, the sales time will be shorter with
more sales churn and prices therefore higher. Hence greater sales cause higher prices. Similarly
greater vacancy (inventory) raises sales times and causes lower prices.
There are also a series of papers which propose that negative changes in prices will
subsequently generate lower sales volumes. This again is a positive relationship between the two
variables, but with opposite causality. The first of these is by Stein (1995) followed by Lamont and
Stein (1999) and then Chan (2001). In these models, liquidity constrained consumers are again
moving from one house to another ("chum") and must make a down payment in order to purchase
housing. When prices decline consumer equity does likewise and fewer households have the
remaining down payment to make the lateral move. As prices rise, equity recovers and so does
market liquidity. Relying instead on behavior economics, Genesove and Mayer (2001) and then
Englehardt (2003) show empirically that sellers who would experience a loss if they sell set higher
reservations than those who would not experience a loss. With higher reservations, the market as a
whole would see lower sales if more and more sellers experience loss aversion as prices continue to
drop.
/ 
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In this section I try to unravel the relationship between housing prices and housing sales,
and in addition, the inventory of housing units for sale. I accomplish the following:
1). First, I carefully examine gross housing flows in the AHS for the 11 (odd) years in which
the survey is conducted and find there are more purchases of homes by renters or new households
than there are by existing owners. Hence the focus on own-to-own trades does not characterize the
majority of housing sales transactions.
2). I also examine which flows add to the inventory of for-sale units (called LISTS) and
which subtract (called SALES). Own-to-own moves, for example do both. I show with a simple
model that higher prices should generate more LISTS, lower SALES, and hence a larger inventory.
When prices are low, the reverse happens.
3). This leads me to hypothesize a very specific joint causality between sales and prices.
Own-to-own churn generates a positive schedule between sales and prices as suggested by frictional
market theory. At the same time, inter-tenure transitions should lead to a negative schedule. In
equilibrium, the overall housing market should rest at the intersection of these two schedules.
4). To test these ideas I first assemble a US panel data base of 33 MSA from 1999-2008.
The shortness of the panel is due to limited data on the for-sale inventory. An estimated panel VAR
model perfectly confirms our hypothesized relationships. Sales positively drive subsequent prices
while prices negative drive subsequent sales and positively increase the inventory.
5). I also assemble a longer panel of 101 MSA from 1980 to 2006 on just sales and prices.
Using a wide range of model specifications and tests of robustness we find again that sales
positively "Granger cause" subsequent housing price movements, while prices negatively "Granger
cause" subsequent housing sales. These joint relationships are exactly as my model suggests when
owner chum is combined with inter-tenure transitions.
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The chapter is organized as follow. In section 2.1, I set up an accounting framework for
more completely describing gross housing flows from the 2001 AHS. This involves some careful
assumptions to adequately document the magnitude of all the inter tenure flows relative to within
tenure chum and to household creation/dissolution. In Section 2.3, I develop a simple stylized
model of the inter tenure flows to illustrate how they can generate a negative relationship between
prices and sales and a positive relationship between prices and inventory. I also present my
hypothesized pair of relationships between prices and the sales/inventory ratio. In section 2.4, we
test these ideas with a short panel data base (33 MSA) that covers the inventory as well as prices
and sales. In sections 2.5 through 2.7 I present an analysis of a longer panel data set between just
sales and prices across 101 MSA covering the years from 1981-2006. Here again I find conclusive
evidence that sales positively "Granger cause" prices and that prices negatively "Granger cause"
sales. My analysis is robust to many alternative specifications and subsample tests. I conclude with
some thoughts about future research as well as the outlook for US house prices and sales.
2.2 US Gross Housing Flows: Sales, Lists, and -the Inventory.
Much of the theoretical literature on sales and prices investigates how existing homeowners
behave as they try and sell their current home to purchase a new one. This flow is most often
referred to as "churn". To investigate how important a role "churn" plays in the ownership market,
we closely examine the 2001 American Housing Survey. In "Table 10"of the Survey, respondents
are asked what the tenure was of the residence previously lived in - for those that moved during the
last year. The total number of moves in this question is the same as the total in "Table 11" - asking
about the previous status of the current head (the respondent). In "Table 11" it turns out that 25% of
current renters moved from a residence situation in which they were not the head (leaving home,
: :;:; ~_liXI?:____l____ll~~_____~~___il____jj
divorce, etc.). The fraction is a smaller 12% for owners. What is missing is the joint distribution
between moving by the head and becoming a head. The AHS is not strictly able to identify how
many current owners moved either a) from another unit they owned b) another unit they rented or c)
purchased a house as they became a new or different household.
To generate the full set of flows, we use information in "Table 11" about whether the
previous home was headed by the current head, a relative or acquaintance. I assume that all current
owner-movers who were also newly created households - were counted in "Table 10" as being part
of a previous owner household. For renters, we assume that all renter-movers that were also newly
created households were counted in "Table 10" in proportion to renter-owner households in the full
sample. Finally, we use the Census figures that year for the net increase in each type of household
and from that and the data on moves we are able to identify household "exits" by tenure. Gross
household exits occur mainly through deaths, institutionalization (such as to a nursing home), or
marriage.
Focusing on just the owned housing market, the AHS also allows us to account for virtually
all of the events that add units to the inventory of houses for sale (herein called LISTS) and all of
those transactions that remove units from the inventory (herein called SALES). There are two
exceptions. The first is the net delivery of new housing units. In 2001 the Census reports that
1,242,000 total units were delivered to the for-sale market. Since we have no direct count of
demolitions' we use that figure also as net and it is counted as additional LISTS. The second is the
net purchases of 2 nd homes, which must be counted as additional SALES, but about which there is
simply little data2. In theory, LISTS - SALES should equal the change in the inventory of units for
'The growth in stock between 1980-1990-2000 Censuses closely matches summed completions suggesting negligible
demolitions over those decades. The same calculation between 1960 and 1970 however suggests removal of 3 million
units.
2 Net second home purchases might be estimated from the product of: the share of total gross home purchases that are
second homes (reported by Loan Performance as 15.0%) and the share of new homes in total home purchases (Census,
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sale. These relationships are depicted in Figure 2 and can be summarized with the identities below
(2001 AHS values are included).
SALES = Own-to-Own + Rent-to-Own + New Owner [+ 2nd homes] = 5,281,000
LISTS = Own-to-Own + Own-to-Rent + Owner Exits + New homes = 5,179,000
Inventory Change = LISTS - SALES
Net Owner Change = New Owners - Owner Exits + Rent-to-Own - Own-to-Rent
Net Renter Change = New Renters - Renter Exits + Own-to-Rent - Rent-to-Own
(1)
The only other comparable data is from the National Association of Realtors (NAR), and it
reports that in 2001 the inventory of units for sale was nearly stable. The NAR however reports a
slightly higher level of sales at 5,335,000 existing units. 3 This small discrepancy could be explained
by repeat moves within a same year since the AHS asks only about the most recent move. It could
also represent some 2nd home sales which again are not part of the AHS move data.
What is most interesting to us is that almost 60% of SALES involve a buyer who is not
transferring ownership laterally from one house to another. So called "Chum" is actually a minority
of sales transactions. The various inter-tenure sales also are the critical determinants of change-in-
inventory since "Chum" sales leave the inventory unaffected.
25%). This would yield 3-4% of total transactions or about 200,000 units. There are no direct counts of the annual
change in 2 nd home stocks.
3 The AHS is a repeat sample of housing units and excludes moves into new houses. Thus we compare its move number
to NAR sales (both single and multi family) of existing units.
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Figure 2: US Housing Gross Flows (2001)
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Most inter-tenure SALES would seem to be events that one might expect to be sensitive
(negatively) to housing prices. When prices are high presumably new created owner household
formation is discouraged or at least deflected into new renter household formation. Likewise moves
which involve changes in tenure from renting to owning also should be negatively sensitive to
house prices. Both result because higher prices simply make owning a house less affordable. At this
time we are agnostic about how net 2nd home sales are related to prices.
On the other side of Figure 2, many of the events generating LISTS should be at least
somewhat positively sensitive to price. New deliveries certainly try to occur when prices are high,
L
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and such periods would be appropriate for any owners who wish or need to "cash out", consume
equity or voluntarily choose to switch to renting. At this time I am still seeking a direct data source
which investigates in more detail what events actually generate the own-to-rent moves. Thus the
flows in and out of homeownership in Figure 2 suggest that when prices are high sales likely
decrease, lists increase and the inventory grows.
The AHS has been conducted only semi-annually until very recently and also has used a
consistent definition of moving only since 1985. In Appendix 2.3, I calculate the flows for each of
the 11 AHS surveys between 1985 and 2007. The flows are remarkably stable, although there do
exist interesting year to year variations. In all years, own-to-own moves ("churn") are less than the
sum of new owners plus rent-to-own moves. Since the 2001 survey, the AHS values for LIST-
SALES have increased significantly which is consistent with the growing national inventory
reported in the NAR data.
2.3. A stylized model of inter-tenure flows.
Here I assume that the total number of households T is fixed with H < T being home
owners. Those not owning rent at some fixed (exogenous) rent - so I am largely ignoring the rental
market. The total stock of units available for ownership U(p) is assumed to depend positively on
price (long run supply) and with fixed rents we ignore rental supply. In this situation the inventory
of units for sale is the difference between owner stock and owner households: I = U(p) - H.
Households flow out of ownership at some constant rate a which could represent
unemployment, foreclosure, or other economic shock. Rental households purchase units out of the
owner stock (become owners) at some rate s(p) which I presume depends negatively on price. High
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prices (relative to the fixed rent) make ownership less appealing, but in general renters wish to
become owners because of some assumed advantage (the tax subsidy for example).
The equations below summarize both flows (time derivatives) and steady state values
(denoted with *). Equation (2) simply says that the stable homeownership rate depends negatively
on prices and the constant economic shock rate. When prices generate a sales rate equal to the
economic shock rate, homeownership is a reasonable 50%. Equation (3) cleanly divides up the
inventory change into the same two categories from our more detailed flow diagram: LISTS-
SALES. Here LISTS are stock change (new construction) plus own-to-rent flows (economic
shocks) while SALES are rent-to-own flows (whose equilibrium value is the last expression in (3).
dH/dt=s(p)[T-H]-aH, H - (p)T (2)
a + s(p)
dl / dt = dU / dt - dH / dt = [dU / dt + aH] - s(p)[T - H], (3)
I* = (p) - H* = aU(p) + s(p)U(p) - sT >0
I = U(p)- H s 2 0
a + s(p)
s(p)[T- H*] a )T
a + s(p)
In equations (3) I must assume a non-negative inventory. Combining equations (2) and (3) I
show below that as prices increase, the steady state value of the inventory grows and the steady
state level of SALES decreases - as hypothesized about the flows diagramed in Figure 2.
dI*/dp=dU/dp-dH'/dp = dU/dp- Tds/dp [l-s] > 0 (4)
a+s ax+s
d (s(p)[T-H*])/dp = cTds/dp[1- s < 0
a+s a+s
Again the conclusions above follow from the assumptions that long run stock is positively
related to price and the sales rate is negative related to price. Thus this simple model of inter-tenure
flows establishes a negative relationship between housing prices and subsequent Sales/Inventory
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ratios. Alternatively, there should be a positive relationship between prices and subsequent
duration.
With this new schedule between prices and duration we are now ready to better describe the
full set of relationships in the owner market between sales, prices and the inventory. We combine
this new schedule with the positive schedule between prices and the Sale/Inventory ratio - created
from the various models of own-to-own decisions. In these latter models it is sales that are
determining prices, while with the model in (2)-(4) above it is prices that are determining sales. At a
more complete equilibrium (in the ownership market) sales, prices and the inventory all rest at the
intersection of the two schedules shown in Figure 3. Figure 3 presents a more complete picture of
the housing market than the models of Stein, Wheaton, or Berkovec and Goodman - since it
accounts for the very large role of inter-tenure mobility as well as for owner chum.
Figure 3: Housing Market Equilibrium(s)
Search Based Pricing
(own-to-own "churn")
Pricing based Sales
(Inter-tenure choices)
Sales / Inventory
The out-of-equilibrium dynamics of this model are also appealing and seem in line with
economic intuition as well. Consider a permanent increase in economic shocks (a). Using (2) and
(3), owner households decline, and the inventory increases. Sales however also increase and so the
impact on duration is technically ambiguous. Within a wide range of reasonable parameter values
however, we can show that the sale/inventory ratio declines with greater a - the net shift in the
price-to-sales schedule is therefore inward.4 The new equilibrium then has prices lower with a lower
sales/inventory ratio (a higher duration). If we shift the s(p) schedule up (for example with a greater
tax subsidy for ownership) the number of owners increases and the inventory drops, while sales
increase. This leads to an unambiguous rightward shift in the price-to-sales schedule with a
corresponding equilibrium rise in Sales/Inventory (drop in duration) and rise in prices.
The next task is to see if I can empirically identify the pair of relationships in Figure 3. For
this, I turn to several panel data bases with different degrees of richness. The first data base is
shorter and covers only 33 MSA. Its advantage is that it includes data on the inventory for sale by
market - a series which the NAR has collected only recently. The second data base is much longer,
covers 101 MSA, but includes only information on sales and prices.
2.4. A Short-Panel Analysis of Metropolitan Sales, Prices and Inventory.
Carefully constructed data series on Sales and Prices are available since the late 1970s or
early 1980s and for a wide range of metropolitan areas. The price data we use is the deflated
OFHEO repeat sales series [Baily, Muth, Nourse (1963)]. This data series has recently been
questioned for not factoring out home improvements or maintenance and for not factoring in
depreciation and obsolescence [Case, Pollakowski, Wachter (1991), Harding, Rosenthal, Sirmans
4 A sufficient condition is for the number of renters [T-H] to exceed the for-sale inventory.
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(2007)]. That said I am left with what is available, and the OFHEO index is the most consistent
series available for most US markets over a long time period. The only alternative is
CSW/FISERV, and it is available for far fewer metropolitan areas that in turn are disproportionately
concentrated in the south and west.
In terms of sales, the only consistent source is that provided by the National Association of
Realtors (NAR). The NAR data is for single family units only (it excludes condominium sales in
the MSA series), but is available for each MSA over the full period from 1980 to 2006. The more
limiting data series is that on the inventory of housing units for sale. Here the NAR distributes data
only from 1999 (and for many MSA much later). I have been able to put together the three series
since 1999 for 33 MSA, and Figure 4 illustrates the data for Washington D.C. In the first frame of
Figure 4 we clearly see the strong negative relationship between duration and price (changes). The
second frame shows a clear positive relationship between prices and inventory (change), while the
final frame shows the negative relationship between prices and sales (changes). In the figures it
seems clear that the relationships are not purely static - as modeled in (2)-(4). Rather, at high prices
for example, sales ratchet down over time and the inventory ratchets upward.
These observations suggest that a panel VAR is the appropriate instrument to test the
relationships. In the VAR I will have each variable depending on lagged values of itself and the
other variables. If the panel is of order one, we also can use each coefficient as an effective test of
"Granger causality". A final issue with this data involves some strong patterns of seasonality in the
data. Prices seem smooth, but sales and the inventory exhibit strong seasonality. This is difficult to
model directly since the patterns can be quite different for different MSA. In Figure 4 all changes
are calculated as year-over-year, and for this reason we use a 4-period lag throughout the VAR.
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Figure 4: Washington Sales, Prices, Inventory
0.7
0.02
150
100
75
50
25
0
-50
30
22
10
0
-10
20
.80
.40
WashingtonDO
1999 2000 2C 1 120 200 2001 2005 2)36 2007 2008
leduntio, i NIl
19M 203) 20 20 2002 203 2004 205 2306 20D7 2008
1- irertory change plpi
/J~AjNA
1999 2)0 201 2)C2 )3 2 200 230G 2)7 20oB
F- psaiso th - hpi
The results of a simple 3 variable VAR are shown in Table 1.5 In all respects, the results
fully support equations (2)-(4) and the pair of relationships in Figure 3. In the first equation,
duration is effectively measured with separate Sales and Inventory series. The signs here show
duration negatively "Granger cause" subsequent prices. Prices then positively "Granger cause" the
inventory to grow, and likewise for sales to decline. All coefficients are highly significant and the
large coefficients on the lagged own variable suggest all the series have considerable momentum.
The first VAR equation validates the upward schedule in Figure 3 while the second and third
5 We do not report the cross section fixed effects, which in general are quite significant. Standard errors are shown in
parenthesis
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combine to yield the downward schedule. In Table 2, I present the results using the Holtz Eakin et
al. approach with seasonal effects. The results are consistent with those in Table 1.
Table 1: Quarterly Panel VAR, 1999-2007, 33 MSA
a, + .833 Pt-4 - .0021 It-4(63.1) (8.5) +.0012 St-4,(9.4)
aj + .921 It-4 + 93.9 Pt-4 + .032 St-4 ,(53.2) (10.1) (3.3)
a, + .819 St- 4 - 102 .6 Pt-4 -. 072 It4,(52.3) (6.7) (2.4)
R 2 = .885
R 2 = .945
R 2 = .98
Table 2: Quarterly Panel VAR Using Holtz Eakin et al Approach with Seasonal effects,
1999-2007, 33 MSA
33 4 33
P = aj +I ajquarter +
j=1 i=1 j=1
.9819115 P_ -
(427.85)
.0000966 It1(-22.31) + .0006243(19.79)
4 33
+ 1 ajquarteri +
i=1 j=1
4 33
+ I ajquarteri +
i=1 j=1
4 33
+ a ~ quarter, +
i=1 j=1
.8847076 I,_1 +(57.69)
.8864376 It_ +
(62.09)
.916015 S,_1 -(76.60)
64.37069 P- -. 2123897 S,,1 +385.1749 year( 4.14) ( -1.41) ( 1.66)
94.84853 Pt-1 -. 0774326 S,,1( 7.64) (-0.57)
2.864344
(-1.84)
P, - .0041445 I t_,(-2.30)
33
Pt =
j=1
33
It =
j=1
33
j=1
33
I, = aj
j=1
33
I, = aj
j=1
33
St = aj
j=1
St-,
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2.5. A long-Panel of Metropolitan Sales and Prices.
To more carefully study the relationship(s) between housing sales and housing prices Ialso
assembled a larger panel data base covering 101 MSA and the years 1981 through 2006. 6 This
panel was purposely structured to be annual so as to avoid the seasonality of the shorter panel,
while still maintaining plentiful degrees of freedom.
To better standardize the sales data in this panel raw sales were compared with annual
Census estimates of the number of total households in those markets. Dividing single family sales
by total households I get estimated sales rate for each market. In a similar manner I set the price
level in each market to 100 in the base year. These re-scaling of the data will help make the cross
section fixed effects smaller in the estimated VAR models.
In Figures 6 and 7 we illustrate the yearly NAR sales rate data, along with the constant
dollar OFHEO price series - both in levels and differences - for two markets that exhibit quite
varied behavior, Atlanta and San Francisco. Over this time frame, Atlanta's constant dollar prices
increase very little while San Francisco's increased almost 200%. San Francisco prices, however,
exhibit far greater price volatility. Atlanta's average sales rate is close to 4% and displays a strong
trend over 1980-2006, while San Francisco's is almost half of that (2.6%) and increases by less.
These trends illustrate the typical range of patterns seen across our sample of 101 metropolitan
areas. In Appendix 2.1, we present the summary statistics for each market's price and sales rate
series. In virtually all markets there is a long term positive trend in the sales rate, as well as in real
house prices.
6 There have been a few recent attempts test the relationship between movements in sales and prices. Leung, Lau, and
Leong (2002) undertake a time series analysis of Hong Kong Housing and conclude that stronger Granger Causality is
found for sales driving prices rather than prices driving sales. Andrew and Meen (2003) examine a UK Macro time
series using a VAR model and conclude that transactions respond to shocks more quickly than prices, but do not
necessarily "Granger Cause" price responses. Both studies are hampered by limited observations.
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The data in Figure 4 and used in the short panel showed no obvious trends; prices, sales and
the inventory generally rise and then fall. The longer term series in Figure 5 have more persistent
trends and so it is important to test more formally for series stationarity. There are two tests
available for use with panel data and in each, the null hypothesis is that all of the individual series
have unit roots and are non stationary. Levin-Lin (1993) and Im-Persaran-Shin (2002) both develop
a test statistic for the sum or average coefficient of the lagged variable of interest - across the
individuals (markets) within the panel. The null is that all or the average of these coefficients is not
significantly different from unity. In Table 1 we report the results of this test for both housing price
and sale rate levels, as well as a 2 nd order stationarity test for housing price and sales rate changes.
Figure 5: Atlanta Sales, Prices
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Figure 6: San Francisco Sales, Prices
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Table 3: Stationarity tests
RHPI (Augmented by 1 la)
I\I\ I \I\ I \I \ I \ I\I \ I I\\I
Levin Lin's Coefficient T Value T-Star P>T
Test
Levels -0.10771 -18.535 0.22227 0.5879
First Difference -0.31882 -19.822 -0.76888 0.2210
IPS test T-Bar W(t-bar) P>T
Levels -1.679 -1.784 0.037
First Difference -1.896 -4.133 0.000
-
-
-
- GRRHPI
C- - -RSFSALESRATE
L
I
SFSALESRATE (Augmented by 1 lag)
Levin Lin's Coefficient T Value T-Star P>T
Test
Levels -0.15463 -12.993 0.44501 0.6718
First Difference -0.92284 -30.548 -7.14975 0.0000
IPS test T-Bar W(t-bar) P>T
Levels -1.382 1.426 0.923
First Difference -2.934 -15.377 0.000
With the Levin-Lin test we cannot reject the null (non-stationarity) for either house price
levels or differences. In terms of the sales, we can reject the null for differences in sales rate, but not
for levels. The IPS test (which is argued to have more power) rejects the null for house price levels
and differences and for sales rate differences. In short, both variables would seem to be stationary in
differences, but levels are more problematic and likely non-stationary.
2.6. Long Panel Estimations.
My panel approach uses a well-known application of Granger-type analysis. I will ask how
significant lagged sales are in a panel model of prices which uses lagged prices and then several
conditioning variables. The conditioning variables we choose are market area employment, and
national mortgage rates. The companion model is to ask how significant lagged prices are in a panel
model of sales using lagged sales and the same conditioning variables. This pair of model is shown
(5).
P,,T = ao + alP,_, + a2Si,T_ + p'X,,T + 8, + E,T (5)
S,T = Yo + YlSg,T-1 + Y2zP,T-1 + A' X,T + +17i + C,T
With a significant concern about the stationarity of both series in levels, we estimate (5)
largely out of curiosity. More reliable estimates will come from estimating the model in differences
- as specified in (6).
AP,T = a + a~AP,T-1 + 2ASi,T-1 + " Xi,T +t ,T (6)
AS,T = Yo + YlASi,T-1 + Y ,T-1 + A'AXi,T + +7i + 1,T
In panel VAR models with individual heterogeneity there exists a specification issue. The
Equations in (5) or (6) can have an error term that is correlated with the lagged dependent variables
[Nickell, (1981)]. OLS estimation will yield coefficients that are both biased and also that are not
consistent in the number of cross-section observations. Consistency occurs only in the number of
time series observations. Thus estimates and any tests on the parameters of interest (the a and y)
may not be reliable. These problems might not be serious in our case since we have 26 time series
7 In (6) the fixed effects are cross-section trends rather than cross section levels as in (5)
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observations (more than many panel models). To be on the safe side, however, we also estimated
the equations following an estimation strategy by Holtz-Eakin et al. As discussed in Appendix 2.2,
this amounts to using 2-period lagged values of sales and prices as instruments with GLS
estimation.
From either estimates, we conduct a "Granger" causality test. Since I am only testing for a
single restriction, the t statistic is the square root of the F statistic that would be used to test the
hypothesis in the presence of a longer lag structure (Greene, 2003). Hence, I can simply use a t test
(applied to thea 2 and 2 ) as the check of whether changes in sales "Granger cause" changes in
price and vice versa.
In Table 3, I report the results of equations (5) and (6) in each set of rows. The first column
uses OLS estimation, the second the Random Effects IV estimates from Holtz-Eakin et al. The first
set of equations is in levels, while the second set of rows reports the results using differences. In all
Tables, variable names are self evident and differences are indicated with the prefix GR. Standard
errors are in parenthesis.
Among the levels equations, I first notice that the two conditioning variables, the national
mortgage rate and local employment have the wrong signs in two cases. The mortgage interest rate
in the OLS price levels equation and local employment in the IV sales rate equation are miss-
signed. There is also an insignificant employment coefficient in the OLS sales rate equation
(despite almost 2500 observations). Another troublesome result is that the price levels equation has
excess "momentum" - lagged prices have a coefficient greater than one. Hence prices (levels) can
grow on their own without necessitating any increases in fundamentals, or sales. I suspect that these
two anomalies are likely the result of the non-stationary feature to both the price and sales series
when measured in levels. Interestingly, the two estimation techniques yield quite similar
coefficients - as might be expected with a larger number of time series observations.
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When we move to the results of estimating the equations in differences all of these issues
disappear. The lagged price coefficients are small so the price equations are stable in the 2nd degree,
and the signs of all coefficients are both correct - and highly significant.
As to the question of causality, in every price or price growth equation, lagged sales or
growth in sales is always significantly positive. Furthermore in every sales rate or growth in sales
rate equation, lagged prices (or its growth) are also always significant. Hence there is clear evidence
of joint causality, and the effect of lagged prices on sales is always of a negative sign. Holding
lagged sales (and conditioning variables) constant, a year after there is an increase in prices - sales
fall. This is the opposite of that predicted by theories of loss aversion or liquidity constraints, but
fully consistent with the role played by tenure choices in Figure 2 and our simple model of these
flows.
Table 4: Sales-Price VAR
Fixed Effects E Holtz-Eakin estimator
Levels
Real Price
(Dependent Variable)
Constant -25.59144** -12.47741**
(2.562678) (2.099341)
Real Price (lag 1) 1.023952** 1.040663**
(0.076349) (0.0076326)
Sales Rate (lag 1) 3.33305** 2.738264**
(0.2141172) (0.2015346)
Mortgage Rate 0.3487804** -0.3248508**
(0.1252293)
0.0113145**
(0.0018579)
Employment
(0.1209959)
0.0015689**
(0.0003129)
Sales Rate
(Dependent Variable)
Constant
Real Price (lag 1)
Sales Rate (lag 1)
Mortgage
Employment
First Difference
GR Real Price
(Dependent Variable)
Constant
GR Real Price (Lag 1)
GR Sales Rate (Lag 1)
GR Mortgage Rate
2.193724**
(0.1428421)
-0.0063598**
(0.0004256)
0.8585273**
(0.0119348)
-0.063598**
(0.0069802)
-0.0000042
(0.0001036)
1.796734**
(0.1044475)
-0.0059454**
(0.0004206)
0.9370184**
(0.0080215)
-0.0664741**
(0.0062413)
-0.0000217**
(0.0000103)
-0.4090542**
(0.1213855)
0.7606135**
(0.0144198)
0.0289388**
(0.0057409)
-0.093676**
(0.097905)
-0.49122**
(0.1221363)
0.8008682**
(0.0148136)
0.1826539**
(0.022255)
-0.08788**
(0.0102427)
~1_1~1_
___l_____________m_________ _~ ~I
GR Employment
GR Sales Rate
(Dependent Variable)
Constant
GR Real Price (Lagl)
GR Sales Rate (Lag 1)
GR Mortgage Rate
GR Employment
** indicates significance at
0.3217936**
(0.0385593)
0.7075247
(0.3886531)
-0.7027333**
(0.0461695)
0.0580555**
(0.0183812)
-0.334504**
(0.0313474)
1.167302**
(0.1244199)
5%.
0.1190925**
(0.048072)
1.424424**
(0.3710454)
-0.8581478**
(0.0556805)
0.0657317**
(0.02199095)
-0.307883**
(0.0312106)
1.018177**
(0.1120497)
I have experimented with these models using more than a single lag, but qualitatively the
results are the same. In levels, the price equation with two lags becomes dynamically stable in the
sense that the sum of the lagged price coefficients is less than one. As to causal inference, the sum
of the lagged sales coefficients is positive, highly significant, and passes the Granger F test. In the
sales rate equation, the sum of the two lagged sales rates is virtually identical to the single
coefficient above and the lagged price levels are again significantly negative (in their sum).
Collectively higher lagged prices "Granger cause" a reduction in sales. We have similar conclusions
31
-- ---
" II
when two lags are used in the differences equations, but in differences, the 2 nd lag is always
insignificant.
As a final test, I investigate a relationship between the growth in house prices and the level
of the sales rate. In the search theoretic models sales rates determine price levels, but if prices are
slow to adjust, the impact of sales might better show up on price changes. Similarly the theories of
loss aversion and liquidity constraints relate price changes to sales levels. While the mixing of
levels and changes in time series analysis is generally not standard, this combination of variables is
also the strong empirical fact shown in Figure 1. In Table 4 price changes are tested for Granger
causality against the level of sales (as a rate).
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Table 5: Sales-Price Mixed VAR
Differences and Levels Fixed Effects E Holtz-Eakin estimator
GR Real Price
(Dependent Variable)
Constant
GR Real Price (lag 1)
Sales Rate (lag 1)
GR Mortgage Rate
GR Employment
Sales Rate
(Dependent Variable)
Constant
GR House Price (lag 1)
Sales Rate (lag 1)
GR Mortgage Rate
GR Employment
-6.61475**
(0.3452743)
0.5999102**
(0.0155003)
1.402352**
(0.0736645)
-0. 1267573**
(0.0092715)
0.5059503**
(0.0343458)
-0.0348229
(0.0538078)
-0.0334235**
(0.0024156)
1.011515**
(0.0114799)
-0.0162011**
(0.0014449)
0.0494462**
(0.0053525)
-1.431187**
(0.2550279)
0.749431**
(0.0141281)
0.2721678**
(0.0547548)
-0.0860948**
(0.0095884)
0.3678023**
(0.0332065)
0.0358686
(0.0026831)
-0.0370619**
(0.0026831)
1.000989**
(0.0079533)
-0.0151343**
(0.0014294)
0.043442**
(0.0049388)
** indicates significance at 5%
In terms of causality, these results are no different than the models estimated either in all
levels or all differences. One year after an increase in the level of sales, the growth in house prices
accelerates. Similarly, one year after house price growth accelerates the level of home sales falls
(rather than rises). All conditioning variables are significant and correctly signed and lagged
dependent variables have coefficients less than one.
2.7. Long Panel Tests of Robustness.
In panel models it is always a good idea to provide some additional tests of the robustness of
results, usually by dividing up either the cross section or time series of the panel into subsets and
examining these results as well. Here we perform both tests. First we divide the MSA markets into
two groups: so-called "coastal" cities that border either ocean, and "interior" cities that do not.
There are 31 markets in the former group and 70 in the latter. The coastal cities are often felt to be
those with strong price trends and possibly different market supply behavior. These results are in
Table 5. The second test is to divide the sample up by year - in this case we estimate separate
models for 1980-1992 and 1993-2006. The year 1992 generally marks the bottom of the housing
market from the 1990 recession. These results are depicted in Table 6. Both experiments use just
the differences model that seems to provide the strongest results from the previous section.
Table 6:Geographic Sub Panels
Fixed Effects E Holtz-Eakin estimator
Coastal MSA Interior MSA Coastal MSA Interior MSA
GR Real Price
(Dependent
Variable)
Constant -0.6026028 -0.274607** -0.543562 -.338799**
(0.2974425) (0.1132241) (0.3332429) .1054476
GR Real Price 0.7661637** 0.7731355** 0.855731** .7834749**
(Lag 1) (0.0255794) (0.0178884) (0.0351039) .0171874
GR Sales Rate 0.0608857** .0094349* 0.3475212** .0799289**
(Lag 1) (0.0141261) (0.0054047) (0.0573584) .0198759
GR Mortgage Rate -0. 106036** -.0866954** -0.112101** -.0776626**
(0.023653) (0.0092136) (0.0278593) .008816
GR Employment 0.5717489** .1978858** -0.0434497 .1617733**
(0.0978548) (0.0359637) (0.153556) .0381004
GR Sales Rate
(Dependent
Variable)
Constant 2.098906** 0.0396938** 3.03388** 0.8084169*
(0.7412813) (0.4541917) (0.7426378) (0.4261651)
GR Real Price -0.8320889** -0.5447358** -0.9763902** -0.8519448**
(Lagl) (0.0637485) (0.0637485) (0.0798291) (0.0919725)
GR Sales Rate -0.0004387 0.0770193** -0.0350817 0.1111637**
(Lag 1) (0.0352049) (0.0216808) (0.0402424) (0.0251712)
GR Mortgage Rate -0.2536587** -0.3772017** -0.2390963** -0.3323406**
(0.0589476) (0.0369599) (0.0595762) (0.036746)
GR Employment 1.265286** 1.172214** 1.102051** 1.03251**
(0.2438722) (0.1442662) (0.2223687) (0.1293764)
Note:
a) *- 10 percent significance. **- 5 percent significance.
b) MSAs denoted coastal are MSAs near the East or West Coast (see Appendix I).
c) MSAs denoted interior are MSAs that are not located at the East or West Coast.
In Table 5, the results of Table 4 hold up remarkably strong when the panel is divided by
region. The coefficient of sales rate (growth) on prices is always significant although so-called
"costal" cities have larger coefficients. In the equations of price (growth) on sales rates, the
coefficients are always significant, and the point estimates are very similar as well. The negative
effect of prices on sales rates is completely identical across the regional division of the panel
sample. It should be pointed out that all of the instruments are correctly signed and significant as
well.
The conclusion is the same when the panel is split into two periods (Table 6). The coefficients
of interest are significant and of similar magnitudes across time periods, and all instruments are
significant and correctly signed as well. The strong negative impact of prices on sales clearly
occurred during 1982-1992 as well as over the more recent period from 1993-2006. With fewer
time series observations in each of the (sub) panels in Table 6, the Holtz-Eakin estimates are now
sometimes quite different than the OLS results.
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Table 7: Time Subpanels
Fixed Effects E Holtz-Eakin estimator
1982-1992 1993-2006 1982-1992 1993-2006
GR Real Price
(Dependent
Variable)
Constant -2.63937** -0.1053808 -1.237084** -0.2731544
(0.2362837) (0.1453335) (0.2879418) (0.1943765)
GR Real Price 0.5521216** 0.9364014** 0.6752733** 0.9629539**
(Lag 1) (0.0271404) (0.0183638) (0.0257512) (0.0196925)
GR Sales Rate 0.0194498** 0.0363384** 0.1622147** 0.0874362 **
(Lag 1) (0.0073275) (0.0097935) (0.0307569) (0.0307703)
GR Mortgage Rate -0.2315352** -0.0707981** -0.1432255** -0.0812995**
(0.0193262) (0.0116032) (0.0244255) (0.0163056)
GR Employment 0.6241497** 0.4310861** 0.157348* 0.3441402**
(0.063533) (0.0501575) (0.0910416) (0.0493389)
GR Sales Rate
(Dependent
Variable)
Constant -6.269503** 4.398222** -4.898023** 3.00473**
(0.9018295) (0.447546) (0.8935038) (0.4587499)
GR Real Price -0.8795382** -0.5704616** -1.080492** -0.4387881**
(Lagl) (0.1035874) (0.0565504) (0.1243784) (0.066557)
GR Sales Rate 0.0056823 -0.025242 -0.0035275 0.066557
(Lag 1) (0.027967) (0.0301586) (0.0350098) (0.029539)
GR Mortgage Rate -0.5636095** -0. 1934848** -0.550748** -0.2720118**
(0.0737626) (0.0357313) (0.0819038) (0.0420076)
GR Employment 2.608423** 0.4856197** 2.026295** 0.7631351**
(0.2424878) (0.154457) (0.2237316) (0.1325586)
Note:
a) Column labeled under 1982-1992 refer to the results using observations that span those
years..
b) Column labeled under 1993-2006 refer to the results using observations that span those
years.
2,7. Conclusions
We have shown that the causal relationship from prices-to-sales is actually negative - rather
than positive. Our empirics are quite strong. As an explanation, we have argued that actual flows in
the housing market are remarkably large between tenure groups - and that a negative price-to-sales
relationship makes sense as a reflection of these inter-tenure flows. Higher prices lead more
households to choose renting than owning and these flows decrease SALES. Higher prices also
increase LISTS and so the inventory grows. Conversely, when prices are low, entrants exceed exits
into ownership, SALES increase, LISTS decline and so does the inventory.
Our empirical analysis also overwhelmingly supports the positive sales-to-price relationship
that emerges from search-based models of housing chum. Here, a high sales/inventory ratio causes
I ~
higher prices and a low ratio generates lower prices. Thus we arrived at a more complete
description of the housing market at equilibrium - as shown with the two schedules in Figure 3.
Figure 3 offers a compelling explanation for why in the data, the simple price-sales
correlation is so overwhelmingly positive. Over time it must be the "price based sales" schedule
that is shifting up and down. Remember that this schedule is derived mainly from the decision to
enter or exit the ownership market. Easy credit availability and lower mortgage rates, for example
would shift the schedule up (or out). For the same level of housing prices, easier credit increases the
rent-to-own flow, decreases the own-to-rent flow, and encourages new households to own. SALES
expand and the inventory contracts. The end result of course is a rise in both prices as well as sales.
Contracting credit does the reverse. In the post WWII history of US housing, such credit expansions
and contractions have indeed tended to dominate housing market fluctuations [Capozza,
Hendershott, Mack (2004)].
Figure 3 also is useful for understanding the current turmoil in the housing market. Easy
mortgage underwriting from "subprime capital" greatly encouraged expanded homeownership from
the mid 1990s through 2005 [Wheaton and Nechayev, (2007)]. This generated an outward shift in
the price-based-sales schedule. Most recently, rising foreclosures have expanded the rent-to-own
flow and shifted the "price based sales" schedule back inward. This has decreased both sales and
prices. Preventing foreclosures through credit amelioration theoretically would move the schedule
upward again, but so could any countervailing policy of easing mortgage credit. It is interesting to
speculate on whether there might be some policy that would shift the "search based pricing"
schedule upward. This would restore prices, although it would not increase sales. For example some
policy to encourage interest-free bridge loans would certainly make it easier for owners to "chum".
Likewise some form of home sales insurance might reduce the risk associated with owning two
homes. That said, such policies would seem to be a less direct way of assisting the market versus
some stimulus to the. "price-based-sales" schedule.
Chapter 3 Do Bargains Exist in Housing Market? Efficiency of Housing
Market Within Cities
3.1 Introduction
Using a unique panel data set of house prices of neighborhood, we attempt to study whether
the market is efficient at the zip code level within the city. Given the availability of neighborhood
price data over 10 years, we are able to observe the efficiency of housing markets without worrying
about productivity and transaction costs that cost the market to be inefficient. Using the User Cost
model as a framework, I study the price trends across neighborhoods using fixed effects and other
techniques to understand whether prices across neighborhoods diverge over time or overlap each
other periodically. If prices diverge-price of houses in expensive neighborhoods increasing faster
than price of houses in cheap neighborhoods, the market is likely be efficient.
Looking for a cheap home with high growth potential in price is a national pastime of many
home buyers. While most home buyers are looking for the great "bargain", academics , researchers
and policy makers are wrangling over the issue whether such bargains actually exist- or whether the
market is efficient. If the market is efficient, the price in the housing market should reflect the net
present value of future cash flow accrued to or payable by the homeowner from the house. The
cash flow, in this context, is usually referred to the user costs or imputed rent. The user cost of
housing is simply the sum of maintenance costs, cost of foregone return to equity, cost of mortgage
and net property taxes payable less expected growth in price. Examining whether the user costs
exceed the actual rent helps us to identify which regions are underpriced and overpriced above the
fundamentals (Himmelberg, Mayer and Sinai, 2005). The key problem arises from such tests come
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from finding a suitable households' expected growth rate in price. A change in the horizon to
compute the expected growth rate will change the outcomes of the analysis.
Besides comparing the user costs with a benchmark, I expect the high house price is
positively correlated to risk (Capozza, Hendershott, and Mack [2004], Cannon, Miller and Pandher
[2006]) when house price is efficient. In addition, the user costs model implies that the high priced
homes must reflect high appreciation in future if the markets are efficient. I also expect places with
high priced homes will continue to be priced high and low priced homes to be priced low. Any
change in the rankings of places in price will imply the market being efficient. Yet the divergence
in prices between high and low rise housing could be due to several reasons- supply restrictions
(Capozza, Hendershott, Mack and Mayer, 2002), interest rates movements (Himmelberg, Mayer
and Sinai, 2005), behavioral reasons (Brunnermeier and Julliard, 2007 and Case and Shiller, 1988),
or difference in productivities across regions (Van Nieuwerburgh and Weil, 2007, and Gyorko,
Mayer and Sinai, 2006).
Given that most studies look at changes in prices at Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) or
State level, it has been hard to disentangle the different forces affecting the differences in prices
across regions. In addition, households are less likely to arbitrage given the high transaction costs
to move from one MSA or State to another. In this chapter, I try to avoid the problems faced in past
studies by examining the differences in house price within a city at zip- code level. With this unique
panel data set, supply restrictions and difference in productivity across regions are unlikely to
apply. This allows us to examine whether housing market is efficient or not.
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In the following section, I begin with a review of the models and theories in explaining the
differences in house prices across regions in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 lays out a simple theoretical
model to ascertain whether there is inefficiency or not. This is followed by a presentation of our
empirical results in Section 3.3 and a discussion on the limitations.
3.2 Literature Review
The standard user cost model is widely used to explain the dynamics of housing price
market. Hendershott and Slemrod (1983) used it to examine whether homeowners are favored under
property tax, and Poterba (1984) used it to explain how inflation caused the house price to go up
via user costs. Together with an inter-temporal housing consumption framework, Poterba (1984)
fitted the expectation rational framework in the equilibrium and showed that unanticipated shocks
in housing demand will lead to anticipated changes in prices that will alter housing demand.
Himmelberg, et.al (2005) used the user cost as a measure to test whether house prices relative to
rents in 46 metro areas were over priced in 2004. They found that the user coat to actual rent ratio
does not suggest widespread or historically large mispricing of owner-occupied housing in 2004.
Dipasquale and Wheaton [1996] further showed how with anticipated growth, certain locations
within a city would have both high price levels and high growth rates in Ricardian rent, while other
areas would exhibit the reverse. In equilibrium, a "user cost" measure of rent-minus-appreciation
would be exactly the same across locations. Wheaton, Seslen and Pollakowski (2007) further
incorporated the user costs in a two period housing consumption model. The model further
postulates that neighborhoods with high expected house price appreciation and high volatility in
prices will have highly priced housing.
Varying liquidity constraints across regions and prohibitive transaction costs can lead to
divergence in house prices across regions too. Stein (1995) and Ortalo-Magne and Rady (1999,
2001) argue that liquidity constraints could explain the seemingly sensitivity of house prices to
income shocks. Lamont and Stein (1998) and Chan (2001) further shows that house price in places
with less liquidity constraints are more volatile. Hence, when there are positive shocks, places with
easier access to credit will have higher prices. Besides liquidity constraints, Grossman and
Larqoue (1990) show that transaction costs can prevent arbitrage, and the high moving costs can
make some areas persistently more costly to live in than others. Meese and Wallace (1994) found
that pricing inefficiencies in San Francisco area are due to high transaction costs that limit arbitrage
opportunities for rational investors.
Alternatively, several authors argue that psychological factors play a part in house price
dynamics. Case and Shiller (1988) surveyed homebuyers in four cities regarding their expectation
of future price growth and they found that home buyers are myopic. They reported that
homeowners in areas with strong appreciation like Los Angeles in the 1980s, expect greater growth
appreciation than those in Milwaukee, where prices are flat in the eighties. Hence, the divergence in
prices of the markets is a result of "feedback mechanism or social epidemic that encourages housing
as in important investment opportunity." Such feedback expectations can create a housing price
bubble in regions with high price appreciation and lead to divergence in prices. Nevertheless, if
there is a bubble, we expect the bubble to pop when expectations change in future (Siegel, 2003).
As defined by Charles Kindleberger (1987), a bubble as a "sharp rise in price of an asset or range of
assets in a continuous process with the initial rise generating expectations of further rises and
attracting new buyers..... rise is usually followed by a reversal of expectations and a sharp decline
in price often resulting in financial crisis." Empirical studies cannot agree whether the bubble exists
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or not. In the most recent study, Himmelberg, et.al (2005) examines whether house price bubble
exists across different MSAs. They compute the imputed rent (user cost) and compare them with
the actual rents. They found that house prices in most regions are not far off from the fundamentals.
Some researchers argue that there exists some form of first nature advantage (Krugmen, ) or
productivity differences across regions that resulted the price dispersion. Gyourko, Mayer and Sinai
(2006) examines why prices in some "Superstar Cities" consistently lead faster house price growth
for 50 years and suggest that households rationally expect future prices to rise faster in these
"Superstar Cities". Van Nieuweburg and Weil (2007) examine the long run price dispersion and
postulate that productivity differences among regions cause the long run dispersion across cities.
By using some actual parameters in their calibration of their model, they found that even without
supply constraints, house prices among region will diverge.
Given the numerous forces acting in the housing market, it is difficult to disentangle them to
determine whether the market is efficient using the user cost model. My study makes use of a
unique set of panel data that comprises of the price indices for each zip code level. I further derive a
standard house price using the indices and observe whether there is efficiency in the housing
market. Since I am looking at prices changes within the city at zip code level, productivity
differences, high transaction costs and liquidity constraints will not explain why house prices in one
neighborhood is higher than the other in the same city. After controlling for the locational and
physical attributes of each zip code, I can test whether bargains can be found in the market.
3.3 Theory
Suppose each owner faces the user cost, UC, which has the following equation.
UCi,t = rPi,t (1)Pi,t
where P = E(Pt+1 - Pt).
Pi,t refers to the price of housing in location i and at time t. P is the expected appreciation price,
given above. Unlike the specification in Himmelberg et. al (2006), I only focus on mortgage costs
and expected appreciation, and assume the other costs remain costs over time. Equation (1) shows
that the higher the expected appreciation, the lower the user costs assuming all things remain the
same.
Rearranging the user cost function gives us the following:
P = rPi,t - UCit + m (2)Pit
If the market is efficient, the user costs for every location at equilibrium are the same (Dispaquale
and Wheaton ()). We remove the subscript i as shown below.
- = rPt - UCt + m (3)
Equation (3) indicates that expected price appreciation and price should be positively
correlated. Given maintenance costs and user costs across regions are constant, if price of house in
location j is higher than that in location i, then the expected appreciation in location j must be
higher. In that case, house price in location j will either move parallel or away from the house price
in location i. The price trends are further showed in Fig 7.
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Figure 7: Efficient Housing Market
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Alternatively if the market is inefficient, we should observe the price trends to converge or overlap.
Home buyers are able to get homes cheaply and sell them at a high price at a later date, while home
owners of highly priced homes do enjoy similar appreciation in their house price. The price trends
between location i and j will converge and overlap, as shown in Figure 8.
Figure 8: Inefficient Housing Market
Price
Low Price
(location i)
High Price (location
j)
Year
3.4 Empirical Methodologies
The data consists of repeat-sales housing price indices provided to us by Case Shiller Weiss/
FISERV at the zip code level. The data cover four MSAs: Boston, Chicago, Phoenix and San
Diego. In choosing these MSAs, I attempt to create a sample representing a diverse set of
demographic, geographic and housing market related conditions. The Boston metropolitan area
covers 249 ZIP codes from 1982 through 2004, Chicago comprises 152 ZIP codes from 1987
through 2004; Phoenix includes 164 ZIP codes spanning 1998 to 2004 and San Diego covers 86
ZIP codes starting from 1975 to 2004. After dropping the ZIP series that did not meet the length of
time series, the final sample consists of 109 ZIP observations for Boston, 51 for Chicago, 80 for
Phoenix and 42 for San Diego.
I first conduct a hedonic regression of all 4 MSAs, taking account of all the location and
physical attributes of the house. From the hedonic regression, we obtain the price for a
benchmarked single family house for each ZIP observation. The hedonic results are presented in
the Appendix 3.1. The benchmarked house consists of the following attributes- 2 bedroom unit,
built in 1960, and has 1.5 bathrooms. We took the mean lot size and apartment area (of the city) as
our benchmark. Similarly, we take the median income and density as our bench mark. From the
hedonic regression, we derive the price of benchmarked house in 1998. With the indices, we plot
the house prices over the years.
Figure 9: Boston Price Trends
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Note: rprice refers to the real price of 2 bed room house with certain features.
Source: Author computation
As shown in Figure 9, Boston price trends have been trending up, peaking once around
1986-1988. The highly priced neighborhoods are located at West Roxbury, MA, and those
neighborhoods with the lowest priced housing are located at Wayland, MA. The prices for all the
neighborhoods seem to move parallel to one another. For the higher price neighborhoods, their
prices seem to diverge over time from the prices of houses in the low price neighborhoods. There is
also not much over taking occurring among the prices of neighborhoods that fall in the middle
band. Not only do the price diverge, we also find that the ranking in prices of houses do not change
much. The top most expensive neighborhoods remain the same for past 20 years. If there is a
bubble forming in the expensive neighborhoods, we expect the ranking in house price to change in
the future. But for the ranking to stay consistently the same for 20 years means there are more
forces in play. The divergence is unlikely caused by productivity and liquidity constraints because
they are likely to be same across the neighborhoods within the city. One possible cause for the
divergence may be the change in preference over time. Home buy
view more attractive. Homebuyers may find proximity to good scho
market becomes more competitive.
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Figure 11: Phoenix Price Trends
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Note: rprice refers to the real price of 2 bed room house with certain features.
Source: Author computation
The house price trends of San Diego and Phoenix are shown in Figures 9 and 10. The price
(real) trends up in San Diego, like Boston. In addition the prices in the top three most expensive
neighborhoods have a steeper gradient than those prices of the three cheapest neighborhoods in San
Diego. In Phoenix, the prices first fell to the lowest in 1993 and picked up again thereafter. The
most expensive neighborhood in 1985, shown in the yellow line, occupied the top position until
1998. Prices in two neighborhoods (zip code 85003 and 850018) surpassed the top neighborhood
around 1998. The steep rise in prices for both neighborhoods began in 1993, when Phoenix local
authorities implemented several initiatives to rejuvenate the economy. The economy also switched
from a mining and other primary industries oriented economy to one that emphasized on financial
services and research and development.0 /
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Figure 12: Chicago Price Trend
Note: rprice refers to the real price of 2 bed room house with certain features.
Source: Author computation
The price trends in Chicago (shown in Figure 12) appear different from the price trends in
other 3 MSAs. While the top three most expensive neighborhoods stay the same over the period of
observation, there are many changes in ranking from the bottom to mid-level priced neighborhoods.
The change in price trends are likely caused by the tax classification system implemented in some
towns/cities in Cook County. The higher tax on commercial properties led to a flight of firms from
city central, and residential prices in the affected towns are likely to fall.
We tested the change in price again the price level in the following equation of each city.
We need to find out how low price locations perform against high price locations. Using a normal
pooled regression will not answer what we are looking for. This is because the coefficient captures
how appreciation vary against price over time within each neighborhood. To correct this bias, we
demean the change in price and lagged prices for each year and city. This is akin to the fixed
effects test, except using the years as fixed effects.
Ci,t,k - C.,t,k = (Pi,t-k - P.,t-k) + ei,t  (4)
We denote C as the change in price, P , and (3 the coefficient of the lagged price, f the year fixed
effect and e the error term and k represents the number of years in our time window. We conduct
the tests for yearly, 2-yearly and 3-yearly and 5-yearly window. In order to avoid auto correlation,
we do not include years that overlapped with previous windows. The results are shown in the
following tables.
Table 8: Demeaned Change in Price Against Demeaned Prices
3.4.1 Yearly Change in Price against One Year Lagged Price
Boston: Dependent Variable: Yearly Change in Price (demeaned)
Coef. Std. Err. t P>Jt [95% Interval]
Conf.
Price
(Demean
ed)
Lag 1 5.31e-08 7.17e-09 7.40 0.000 3.90e-08 6.72e-08
R Square 0.0230
Adjusted 0.0226
R Square
Phoenix: Dependent Variable: Yearly Change in Price (demeaned)
Coef. Std. Err. t P>tj [95% Interval]
Conf.
Price
(Demean
ed)
Lag 1 1.48e-07 2.47e-08 6.00 0.000 9.97e-08 1.97e-07
R Square 0.0222
Adjusted 0.0216
R Square
San Diego: Dependent Variable: Yearly Change in Price (demeaned)
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Interval]
Conf.
Price
(Demean
ed)
Lag 1 2.83e-08 1.29e-08 2.20 0.028 3.11e-09 5.36e-08
R Square 0.0039
Adjusted 0.0031
R Square
Chicago: Dependent Variable: yearly Change in Price (demeaned)
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Interval]
Conf.
Price
(Demean
ed)
Lag 1 -5.06e-08 3.89e-08 -1.30 0.194 -1.27e-07 2.58e-08
R Square 0.0019
Adjusted 0.0008
R Square
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3.4.2 2-Yearly Change in Price against Two Year Lagged Price
Boston: Dependent variable: Change in Price (Demeaned, 2 years return)
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Interval]
Conf.
Price
(Demean
ed)
Lag 2 1.07e-07 2.32e-08 4.61 0.000 6.15e-08 1.53e-07
R Square 0.0197
Adjusted 0.0188
R Square
Phoenix: Dependent variable: Change in Price (Demeaned, 2 years return)
Coef. Std. Err. t P>Itl [95% Interval]
Conf.
Price
(Demean
ed)
Lag 2 2.62e-07 7.08e-08 3.69 0.000 1.23e-07 4.01e-07
R Square 0.0182
Adjusted 0.0169
R Square
San Diego: Dependent variable: Change in Price (Demeaned, 2 years return)
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Interval]
Conf.
Price
(Demean
ed)
Lag 2 1.23e-07 3.92e-08 3.13 0.002 4.58e-08 2.00e-07
R Square 0.0138
Adjusted 0.0123
R Square
Chicago: Dependent variable: Change in Price (Demeaned, 2 years return)
Coef. Std. Err. t P>Jtj [95% Interval]
Conf.
Price
(Demean
ed)
Lag 2 -2.11e-07 1.29e-07 -1.64 0.102 -4.64e-07 4.20e-08
R Square 0.0068
Adjusted 0.0043
R Square
3.4.3 3-Yearly Change in Price against Three Year Lagged Price
Boston: Dependent variable: Change in Price (Demeaned, 3 years return)
Coef. Std. Err. t P>Itl [95% Interval]
Conf.
Price
(Demean
ed)
Lag 3 1.88e-07 4.22e-08 4.45 0.000 1.05e-07 2.71e-07
R Square 0.0261
Adjusted 0.0248
R Square
Phoenix: Dependent variable: Change in Price (Demeaned, 3 years return)
Coef. Std. Err. t P>tJ [95% Interval]
Conf.
Price
(Demean
ed)
Lag 3 4.67e-07 1.27e-07 3.68 0.000 2.18e-07 7.17e-07
R Square 0.0268
Adjusted 0.0248
R Square
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S an Diego: Denendent variable: Chan3e in Price (Demeaned 3
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Interval]
Conf.
Price
(Demean
ed)
Lag 3 7.10e-08 6.89e-08 1.03 0.303 -6.44e-08 2.06e-07
R Square 0.0020
Adjusted 0.0001
R Square
Chicago: Dependent variable: Change in Price (Demeaned, 3 years return)
Coef. Std. Err. t P>Itl [95% Interval]
Conf.
Price
(Demean
ed)
Lag 3 -3.64e-07 2.14e-07 -1.71 0.089 -7.85e-07 5.62e-08
R Square 0.0099
Adjusted 0.0065
R Square
3.4.4 5-Yearly Change in Price against FiveYear Lagged Price
Boston: Dependent variable: Change in Price (Demeaned, 5 years return)
Coef. Std. Err. t P>Itl [95% Interval]
Conf.
Price
(Demean
ed)
Lag 5 2.86e-07 1.38e-07 2.07 0.039 1.48e-08 5.57e-07
R Square 0.0101
Adjusted 0.0077
R Square
years return)
Phoenix: Dependent variable: Change in Price (Demeaned, 5 years return)
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Interval]
Conf.
Price
(Demean
ed)
Lag 5 4.85e-07 3.87e-07 1.25 0.212 -2.78e-07 1.25e-06
R Square 0.0063
Adjusted 0.0023
R Square
San Diego: Dependent variable: Change in Price (Demeaned, 5 years return)
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Interval]
Conf.
Price
(Demean
ed)
Lag 5 5.85e-07 2.27e-07 2.58 0.010 1.39e-07 1.03e-06
R Square 0.0227
Adjusted 0.0192
R Square
Chicago: Dependent variable: Change in Price (Demeaned, 5 years return)
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Interval]
Conf.
Price
(Demean
ed)
Lag 5 -8.75e-07 6.11e-07 -1.43 0.154 -2.08e-06 3.33e-07
R Square 0.0139
Adjusted 0.0071
R Square
Source: Author computation
I found that changes in prices for San Diego, Boston and Phoenix are positively influenced by one
year lag in price. For Boston, a house that costs one million dollars more than another will
experience an additional 0.5% appreciation rate for a year. If a house worth one million dollars
more than others in Phoenix, the owner of the house will experience an additional 1.5%
appreciation rate compared to the other cheaper homes. The same owner will enjoy less added
appreciation if his house is in San Diego- only an additional 0.2% to the appreciation rate of
cheaper homes. Chicago, alternatively, has prices in the lagged period negatively correlated to
change in prices. A home that costs one million dollars more than the rest will experience 0.5%
less appreciation rate than the other cheaper homes. This could be due to the flight of firms caused
by the property tax classification. When we broaden the window, the signs remain but most of the
coefficients become insignificant. This is not surprising because there are more noises in the
broader window.
3.4.1 Correction of preference changes in physical attributes
In my empirical specifications in previous section, we assume no changes in preferences for
locations over time. But in reality, people may have increasing preferences over certain physical
features of the neighborhood. For instance, home buyers may value sites facing the sea more over
time. This created an omission variable problem as the empirical specifications fail to include such
changes. In fact, we can regard the change in preference a change in fixed effects. In this section,
we try to correct the omission variable specification.
The error term, with changing preferences of fixed effects, can be rewritten as
ei,t -= Otai + Ei,t, (5)
where o is the individual effect arising from each zip and Ei,t is the error term for each zip. In year
1998, there is no fixed effect, i.e. ei,t = Ei,t . This is because we derive the prices from the hedonic
equations in the same year. Hence, Ot represents the change in preference for location
characteristics with respect to the year 1998.
I first remove the time fixed effects by demeaning the price and return variables, which
gives us the following:
Ci,t - C.,t = P(Pi,t_--P,t-_) + 6t(ai - c.) + (Ei, t - E.,t). (6)
The second term of equation (7) represents the how much more the consumers value the individual
effect of the MSA at time t relative to the rest of MSAs in the region on average.
I then take the lagged of one period, multiplied with rho and differenced it with current
period.
(Ci t - C.,t) - r(Ci,t- 1 - C.,t-1)
= [(Pi,t--P.,t- (,t
-2 - ,t 2 ) + [ - a.) - r ((Pit- P.,t-2 - c.)]
+ [(Ei,t - r.-t) - (Eit-l - E.,t-l)]
Since r= Ot/Ot_, the above can be simplified as
(Cit - C.,t) - r(Ci,t-i - C.,t- 1)
= j3((Pi,t-P.,t-l) 
- r(Pi,t- 2 P,t- 2)) + (i,t .,t)
- r(i,t_1 - E,,j)
i L _iiii/__~ ; r _il~; ~__~__;_~_ _ ((ij ______~il__i_)__i~l_ _~_;_
I first find r by running a Prais-Winsten GLS for each zip code, with the demeaned change in price
as the dependent variable and the demeaned price as the independent variable. After obtaining r -
the correlation between two errors spaced by a lag, we then transform the dependent variables (the
demeaned change in price) and independent variables (demeaned price). In other words, I assume
that the correlation in attributes is consistent over the years. There are no changes in preferences
back and fro over time. Since Ei,t-1 and Ei,t are not correlated by construction, we can run a simple
OLS to obtain estimates of beta. The results are shown below.
Table 9: Quasi-Demenaned Tests
Boston: Dependent Variable: Yearly Change in Price (demeaned and quasi-differenced)
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Interval]
Conf.
Price
(Demean
ed and
quasi
differenc
ed)
Lag 1 4.40e-08 6.96e-09 6.33 0.000 3.04e-08 5.77e-08
R Square 0.0177
Adjusted 0.0173
R Square
Phoenix: Dependent Variable: Yearly Change in Price (demeaned and quasi-differenced)
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Interval]
Conf.
Price
(Demean
ed and
quasi
differenc
ed)
Lag 1 1.33e-07 2.73e-08 4.88 0.000 7.97e-08 1.87e-07
R Square 0.0156
Adjusted 0.0149
R Square
San Diego: Dependent Variable: Yearly Change in Price (demeaned and quasi-differenced)
Coef. Std. Err. t P>tI [95% Interval]
Conf.
Price
(Demean
ed and
quasi
differenc
ed)
Lag 1 2.93e-08 1.28e-08 2.28 0.023 4.12e-09 5.44e-08
R Square 0.0043
Adjusted 0.0035
R Square
Chicago: Dependent Variable: yearly Change in Price (demeaned and quasi-differenced)
Coef. Std. Err. t P>jt [95% Interval]
Conf.
Price
(Demean
ed and
quasi
differenc
ed)
Lag 1 -8.19e- 5.03e-08 -1.63 0.104 -1.81e-07 1.68e-08
08
R Square 0.0032
Adjusted 0.0020
R Square
Like the previous test, Boston, Phoenix and San Diego have positive and significant
coefficients for price. The coefficients, however, are smaller than those in previous tests. Phoenix
has the largest coefficient and San Diego has the smallest. Chicago, alternatively, has a negative
and insignificant coefficient for lagged price. The results are consistent with the results in previous
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specifications. The difference in signs is likely caused by the increasingly property tax on
commercial properties that led firms to relocate to the suburbs Dye et. al (2001). The results have
showed that the housing market seems to be efficient for Boston Phoenix and San Diego housing
markets. In particular, I expect owners of high price neighborhoods to enjoy high appreciation and
owners of low price neighborhoods enjoy low user costs. The behavior of Chicago house prices is
different, and I believe that it is partially caused by the flight of firms from center of MSA to the
suburbs. Nevertheless, more data is needed to ascertain the claim.
Conclusion
I found evidence that support the market is quite efficient according to the user cost model
framework, using the neighborhood panel set of data. The data allows us to remove possible
reasons arising from productivity differences and liquidity constraints. We also found that the high
priced neighborhoods are consistently ranked high among others over 10-20 years, ruling out
possible bubble theories. Yet, we cannot control for possible changes in preferences and major
policy shifts. We make use of the quasi-differencing method to remove possible correlation in the
fixed effects, since the correlation reflects changes in preferences over time. We still find strong
positive correlation between price and appreciation for Boston, San Diego and Phoenix Housing
markets. This implies that the housing markets for these three cities are efficient, and buyers are
unlikely to make a bargain. Nevertheless, the Chicago market appears inefficient, with price and
appreciation negatively correlated. Such negative correlation is likely caused by the flight of firms.
Even after adopting quasi-differencing method, I cannot capture all possible changes that
happen over time. We have to assume that the correlation in preferences over the neighborhood
attribute is consistent over time. In addition, exogenous changes like property tax policies are not
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captured in the model either. In future research, a panel set of information on events that
exogenously change preferences could be used to better control the correlation in preferences of the
physical attributes of the neighborhood.
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Chapter 4 Commercial and Residential Property Tax Rates: Why Do Firms Pay
More
4,1: Introduction
The housing market crisis, coupled with the shortage of local tax revenue, brought new
interest in how to raise revenue for local governments. For instance, Massachusetts Budget and
Policy Center reported 3.1b US dollars gap in budget for the 2010 financial year for Massachusetts
alone. To help shoulder the tax burden, local authorities can do the following:
1) Attract more firms to help support the fiscal expenditure by relaxing the zoning
ordinances or reducing tax rates for firms.
2) Impose high tax rates on firms that cannot cheaply relocate.
3) Impose high property tax rates on both commercial and residential properties.
In the 1970s, to help relieve the tax burden of the residents, some States have allowed the
municipals to classify properties for property taxation purposes. In most cases, the commercial
properties are levied at a much higher rate than the residential properties. Several studies studied
the incidence of property tax, the impact on the classification has on the residents and the economic
development of the jurisdiction. In the spirit of Mieszkowski's approach, many studies treat
property tax rates on commercial properties as tax on capital. In addition, firms are courted by the
municipals because they provide employment and income to the local residents (For instance,
Sonestelie (1979) and DiMasi (1988). Yet in the context of the municipals, not many residents
work where they stayed. Rather than providing income and employment to the municipals, the
firms generate negative externalities to the community. In this context, Fischel's approach (1975) is
more suitable. Rather than treating property tax as a capital tax, we deem property tax on
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commercial properties as compensation to residents for the negative externalities the firms
generated.
Using Massachusetts as a case study, we examine why some jurisdictions replace the
uniform property tax system with the classified property tax system. In addition, we examine why
some municipals place most of the burden on firms in the Massachusetts Taxpayers Report. In the
next section, we review the past literature on property tax classification and property tax incidence.
Section 3 covers the theory and Section 4 examines the theory empirically using tax, employment
and other variables.
4.2 Literature Review
The classification of real property in the United States was first instituted in Minnesota in
1913. There are altogether 26 States and District Columbia have property tax classification systems
as of now, according to information from the University of California at Davis' Institute of
Governmental Affairs (See Table 9 below). The property tax classification system adopted by each
State varies from each other- some have fewer classifications and others demand different valuation
ratios.
Table 10: States with Property Tax Classification Systems
iState Number of Different Ratios Different Rates
Alabama 7 X.............. ................................ .... .. .......... ..... ..... . .... .......................... ...... ....... .... . ...................................... .. ................ .................. ........................
Arizona 9 X
Colorado 13
D.C. 3 X
.Georgia 2 X
i~ l l is I2 m y ) ................. ....... . ................... ... .... . ....... .. i f . .... ............ . ... . ..Hawaii X
Illinois !2 (Cook County 6) X
..... ..
j I I
Kansas 113 X
Kentucky :14 I X (state rates)
Louisiana 5 X
Massachusetts 4 X
Minnesota 12
Mississippi 5 X
Missouri 8 X
Montana 11 X
XNebraska 12 
New Hampshire 2 .........
New York Local option
... ...- -- -- - - -- --- -- - - -
North Dakota 2X
Oklahoma 4 X
Rhode Island Local option _
South Carolina 11 X
South Dakota 3 X
Tennessee 4 X
Utah 2 X
West Virginia 4 N
Wyoming _ 3 X ,
Source: http://www.orange-ct.gov/govser/PROPERTY%20TAX%200LR.htm
Some towns, even though they are required by statutes to impose a uniform rate, have a tax
structure that is similar to the tax structure of cities that allowed property classification for tax
purposes. For instance, Hartford credits homeowners a portion of their tax bill. The town can do
this if its post-revaluation effective tax rate on residential properties exceeds 1. 5%. The credit
continues for five years, including the year that the revaluation took effect.
The shift towards the property classification tax system begun in the late 1970s, and it has
garnered much attention. Fischel (1975), adopting the Tiebout model approach, suggests firms
maximizes their profits by scouring for the municipal with cheapest property tax rates. Since the
firms generate negative externalities, they need to compensate the residents by subsidizing the
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residents' expenditure on public services. Firms that pollute more pay higher taxes. Fischel argued
that using property tax rates as a pricing mechanism, instead of a direct payment scheme, for the
negative externalities generated by firms is second best solution. The residents may be better off
using the direct payments to consume private goods and allocate themselves than enjoying the
better services the authorities got from the firms. For instance, elderly residents will be better off if
the firms pay direct payments to the residents than to pay for the provision of schools.
Fischel (1975) further did an studied the tax rates on Bergen County, New Jersey, and found
that 70% of commercial and 52% of industrial property tax levies benefitted residents by either
lowering household tax payments or by increasing local spending (Fischel (1975,p 155).].
Erickson and Wollover, (1987), further provided evidence that increasing the tax base helps reduce
the tax burden of households- $1000 more industrial valuation reduce tax burden by $3.1 per capita.
Oakland and Testa (1995) too find similar results in their study of Philadelphia.
Sonestelie (1979) examines the long term tax incidence of classified property tax system
from a different approach. He adopts Mieszkowski's view (1972) that property tax on firms is akin
to capital tax. In addition, the approach postulates that firms provide local residents employment
and income and does not generate any negative externalities. In his model, there are three zone; the
inner ring is made up of commercial land users, the second ring is a mix between commercial and
residential and the outer ring only comprise of residential properties. His model suggested that a
higher tax rate will tend to shift the burden of property tax from residents of a jurisdiction to the
customers of the commercial establishments and to the jurisdiction's landowners. The former will
bear much of the burden if the demand for commercial real estate is inelastic and vice versa.
Wheaton(1984) shows that the differences in property tax rates among jurisdictions cannot explain
the differences in office rent between jurisdictions, implying that capital owners of land and
commercial properties absorbing the office rent.
DiMasi (1988), using a similar approach, further examines some of the structural and
welfare effects of a change from a tax system in an urban area that classifies property by use for tax
assessment to one that taxes all properties at the same uniform rate. He develops a Computational
General Equilibrium model that adopts a monocentric circular city where the households travel to
the CBD to work. By providing suitable parameters, DiMasi measures the welfare effects if
Massachusetts switch from the classified tax system to the uniform tax system. He found that the
uniform tax system is more superior unless the elasticity of substitution is especially low.
Another related strand of literature examines whether classification property tax system
drives business away. Four studies in the eighties found that tax rates matter. Wasylenko (1980)
examines the effect of property taxes on the number of firms relocating to the suburbs of
Milwaukee from 1964 to 1974, and found property tax is a significant factor. Fox (1981) studies the
effect of taxes and spending on the amount of industrial land in municipalities in the Cleveland
metropolitan area in 1970 and arrives at the same conclusion. Charney (1983) test the effect of local
taxes on new firm locations in zip code areas in Detroit from 1970 to 1975 and found property tax
rates a contributing factor to where new firm locates. McGuire (1985) examines the effect of
property taxes on the location of business building permits in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan
area from 1976 to 1979, and concludes they matter.
More recently, a 1999 analysis of Hartford's tax structure by the Connecticut Center for
Economic Analysis (CCEA) at University of Connecticut found "the cap/surcharge structure seems
to have damaged the City of Hartford economically, creating a hostile environment for businesses
and apartments by distorting the tax burdens of different classes of property" (The Economic
Effects of Revaluation and Tax Policy on the City of Hartford, December 1999). Similarly, The
Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation reported in 1998 that 102 communities used the classification
system to shift an estimated $ 600 million of property taxes from residential to business taxpayers
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in FY 1998. The foundation also cited a "troubling trend" in the 200% growth of the disparity
between the residential and business property tax burden between 1984 and 1998 (Unequal
Burdens: Property Tax Classification in Massachusetts, November, 1998). The organization's
president remarked that the higher business tax burden "adds to the already high costs of doing
business in the Commonwealth, placing many companies at a further competitive disadvantage.
Nevertheless, a study shows that tax classification alone could not have caused firms to relocate.
Dye et al. (2001) examined the claim that classification is responsible in driving away business in
Cook County. They regress the measures of business establishment in Cook County against tax
rates and classification in 1993 and other factors. While they found evidence that property taxes
deter firms, they could not find sufficient evidence that the classification caused the flight of firms.
In my study, I relaxed the assumption that all municipals have same population. In the real
world, the size of each municipal varies a lot. For example, Boston has a population of more than
half a million but Boxborough only has a population of 5000. This warrants the use of Asymmetric
Nash Equilibrium framework. The Asymmetric Nash Equilibrium is been used by Bucovetsky
(1991) to study tax competition among different sizes of jurisdictions. He found that residents in
smaller jurisdictions pay a lower levy and enjoy better welfare than those staying in large
jurisdictions. The small jurisdictions are greatly affected if firms relocate. These small jurisdictions
have high transfer elasticity, making them to charge at low rates. The large jurisdictions are
unlikely affected by moves caused by a raise in tax rate; as each unilateral increase in tax loses
them less per capital. Wheaton (2000) also adopts the Asymmetric Nash Equilibrium in studying
the underprovision of welfare. He found that large states have higher benefits level and payments
because large states face lower migration elasticity. Similarly, in our context, if we implement the
Asymmetric Nash Equilibrium framework, we expect large municipals have higher commercial tax
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rates. This is because like the above, these firms in such large states face a low elasticity to move
compared to firms in small states.
4.3 Case Study- Massachusetts
Since 1780, the Massachusetts Constitution has required uniform assessment of all real
properties subject to taxation. However, this provision has been rarely honored. Not only are
different classes of properties within a single municipality, but properties within the same class are
assessed differently as well. These disparities are illegal and precipitated a landmark court case
(Bettigole vs Assessors of Springfield) in 1961. The result of the case was a judicial mandate for
statewide 100 percent assessment. Some years later, in response to growing pressure to enforce
statewide 100 percent assessment, politicians began to lobby for property tax classification as a way
to legalize existing inter-class disparities. In Massachusetts, classification required a state
constitutional amendment which had to be passed by two sessions of the State Legislature and a
majority of voters in a subsequent state wide referendum. In 1968 and 1969, although the State
legislature passed the referendum, only 36% of the voters supported it and the classification
amendment was not passed.
In 1974, a second case concerning 100 percent assessment (Town of Sudbury vs
Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation) was brought before the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court. The outcome of the case generated pressure to reform assessment practices and
renewed interest in property classification again. In 1975 and 1976, the State Legislature passed a
new classification amendment and placed it on the ballot in 1978. The classification was successful
given much publicity. In 1978, the citizens of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts adopted a
constitutional amendment authorizing the General Court to classify real property into as many as
four separate and distinct classes and thereafter to tax such classes differently. In 1979, the General
Court adopted an act which implemented the amendment. Bloom (1979) argues that local citizens
support property tax classification in Massachusetts because many local residents are not aware of
the alternative measures and their implications. In addition, the continuous promotion of the
advantages of property tax classification and the "good" analyses by media affect the citizens'
perception of monetary self-interest and their votes.
The Classification does not raise additional dollars from the property tax, but serves to
redistribute how much levy will be raised from each class. Preferential tax treatment for any class of
property is not mandated, but the choice of distributing the levy burden among the various classes
remains a local option. The Commissioner of Revenue supervises the implementation of property
classification. After the Commissioner has determined that a city or town's assessed values
represent full and fair cash values, the Assessor classifies all real property according to use. Local
elected officials are then permitted to determine, within limits calculated by the Commissioner,
what percentage of the tax burden is to be borne by each property class. The determination how to
allocate the tax burden by class is made annually by the City Council, generally in November.
Massachusetts law provides for the implementation of the classification process through
three phases: first, every city and town must value all taxable property at full and fair cash value;
second, each city and town must classify every parcel of property according to use; third, each city
and town which has revalued and classified may allocate its tax levy among the various classes of
property. The first and second steps are mandatory. The third stage, determining whether to allocate
the tax burden by class, is optional with each community.
Since 1780, the Massachusetts Constitution has required uniform assessment of all real
properties subject to taxation. However, this provision has been rarely honored. Not only are
different classes of properties within a single municipality, but properties within the same class are
assessed differently as well. These disparities are illegal and precipitated a landmark court case
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(Bettigole vs Assessors of Springfield) in 1961. The result of the case was a judicial mandate for
statewide 100 percent assessment. Some years later, in response to growing pressure to enforce
statewide 100 percent assessment, politicians began to lobby for property tax classification as a way
to legalize existing inter-class disparities. In Massachusetts, classification required a state
constitutional amendment which had to be passed by two sessions of the State Legislature and a
majority of voters in a subsequent state wide referendum. In 1968 and 1969, although the State
legislature passed the referendum, only 36% of the voters supported it and the classification
amendment was not passed.
In 1974, a second case concerning 100 percent assessment (Town of Sudbury vs
Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation) was brought before the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court. The outcome of the case generated pressure to reform assessment practices and
renewed interest in property classification again. In 1975 and 1976, the State Legislature passed a
new classification amendment and placed it on the ballot in 1978. The classification was successful
given much publicity. In 1978, the citizens of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts adopted a
constitutional amendment authorizing the General Court to classify real property into as many as
four separate and distinct classes and thereafter to tax such classes differently. In 1979, the General
Court adopted an act which implemented the amendment. Bloom (1979) argues that local citizens
support property tax classification in Massachusetts because many local residents are not aware of
the alternative measures and their implications. In addition, the continuous promotion of the
advantages of property tax classification and the "good" analyses by media affect the citizens'
perception of monetary self-interest and their votes.
The Classification does not raise additional dollars from the property tax, but serves to
redistribute how much levy will be raised from each class. Preferential tax treatment for any class of
property is not mandated, but the choice of distributing the levy burden among the various classes
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remains a local option. The Commissioner of Revenue supervises the implementation of property
classification. After the Commissioner has determined that a city or town's assessed values
represent full and fair cash values, the Assessor classifies all real property according to use. Local
elected officials are then permitted to determine, within limits calculated by the Commissioner,
what percentage of the tax burden is to be borne by each property class. The determination how to
allocate the tax burden by class is made annually by the City Council, generally in November.
Massachusetts law provides for the implementation of the classification process through
three phases: first, every city and town must value all taxable property at full and fair cash value;
second, each city and town must classify every parcel of property according to use; third, each city
and town which has revalued and classified may allocate its tax levy among the various classes of
property. The first and second steps are mandatory. The third stage, determining whether to allocate
the tax burden by class, is optional with each community.
According to the Massachusetts Tax Foundation, 102 communities used the classification
law to shift property taxes from residential to business taxpayers in the financial year 1998.
Although the classifying communities comprise fewer than a third of the Commonwealth's 351
cities and towns, they account for almost two thirds of the state's population and encompass most of
the state's urban centers and developed suburbs, including all of the larger cities and many towns
with significant amounts of business property. The shift to business property taxpayers in the
classifying communities totaled over $600 million in 1998, almost one-third of the business
property tax bill. In Boston, the largest classifying community, the rate of $38.45 paid by business
taxpayers was more than three times the rate paid by residential taxpayers. In the 101 other
classifying communities, the average tax rate for business of about $28 was almost double the rate
for residences. In contrast, in the 239 communities that did not classify, businesses and residential
taxpayers paid the same tax rates, averaging $14.60 per $1,000 of assessed value over all such
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communities. It is also interesting to note that communities that switched from universal tax regime
to multiple tax regime do not switch back.
4.4 Theory
Suppose there Q number of jurisdiction; each has population ni and houses li firms per
capita. Each jurisdiction has a limit on the number of firms that they can build, k. The jurisdiction
imposes a tax t2on commercial properties and tl on residential properties. The jurisdiction adopts
uniform tax rate system if the tax rates are equal tl = t2 , and property tax classification system if
otherwise. Each resident earns income Y. The total number of firms and population for all the
municipals is N and L respectively.
The residents' utility function is as follow:
U = (k - l)aSbXl - b , (1)
where X is the amount of private goods consumed, S denotes the amount of public services
demanded. a and b are positive constants.
In addition, the income constraint for the resident is such that
Y = t1 + X, (2)
assuming that the price of private good is 1.
The government budget constraint is
S = tl + t 2 1i, (3)
Assumption 1:
This implies I cannot large- nearly equals to one- and t 2 1' cannot be small- near to 0- at the same
time.
li + t2 ,'i < 0 (4)
The assumption is required to ensure residents do not tax firms at an infinitely high tax rate.
Without this assumption, the utility function with respect to tax is an upward sloping curve. The
equality in (2) will ensure the utility function forms a concave function with respect to t 2.
Assumption 2:
We impose the condition that the number of firms that a municipal hold is no larger than the term
on the right hand side of equation (3).
1+a (5)
In other words, we assume that the full capacity of firms a municipal can hold is not reached at any
point in time. As seen later, the residents' tax function reaches an asymptote when li = k
1+a
The residents solve the following optimization problem:
maxtl,t2 (k - I)a(t + t2 1)b (Y - t1 )l - b (6)
First order conditions give us the following
tl + t 2 l = b(Y + t2 1)
i ._ I___jj_;____ijj___li__;ii~;li--.-.ii.-
(7)
caU bU bU
l-- ' + + t2 I' = 0
k-1 tl+lt 2 tl+lt 2
(8)
From the first order conditions in (3), we found that we need the following condition
I + t2 1' < 0 (9)
Since 1' < 0, the first derivative of Utility with respect to t 2 will be positive if assumption 1 is not
met. This implies t2 will go to infinity for residents to maximize their utility.
From (6), we simplify to get the following expression,
b(l+t 2z') al'
(t,+1t2 ) k-1
(10)
Substituting (5) into (8) gives us
(l+t 2 ')
(Y+it 2 )
al'
k-l (11)
Solving the above gives us
aY (k-1)1
2 (k-)-al l'[(k-1)-al] (12)
The firms are adverse to tax rates and will seek to locate in municipals that offer low tax rates. In
addition, the firms are attracted by the population in the municipal as the residents provide labor
and demand for finished goods. We specify the firms' decision to locate as follow:
T -L neflti+zi1(3 (13)
where li =
ni
Taking the first derivatives of /twith respect to t2 gives us
Hence
(14)
(15)
The equilibrium solution using (7) and (8) cannot be readily observed and the relationship between
number of firms and commercial property tax rates are uncertain.
We set the following parameters:
Parameters Initial Values
b 0.2
a 0.3
k 5
P/ -2
Y 1
L 1
ni/N 0.003
I i
We assume that the population of each municipal is the same, n. Then
L niet2i+z 1 L et2i+Zi
ni Lij njeflt2j+Zj] n Ejeflt2j+ZJ (16)
In the beginning, the tax rates for all N municipals are the same. Hence, the number of firms per
L
capita in the municipal is 3
351n
Using the supply function shown in (5) and setting the commercial property tax rate at 2, we
solve for 1, the number of firms in municipal i. We assume that all the municipals of same size and
have the same tax rates initially. We let the tax rates increase over time and observe how the
number of firms change. Similarly, using the number of firms derived from the supply function, we
derive the tax rates using the demand function in (4).
We plot the residents' tax function and firms' location function in Figure 13. The
equilibrium number of firms is 1.47 firms per capita and the equilibrium property tax rate is 0.76.
As expected, we found that the tax rate derived from the demand function reaches an asymptote
where
k (17)
1+a
k
When 1 is less than - , the relationship is different.
1+r
Figure 13: Based on Initial Conditions
Base Case Scenario
T2 (demand)
CL
0 Al
1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8
Number of firmsPer Capita
--- t2(Supply) t2 (demand)
Note: Al is the equilibrium point, where number of firms is 1.47 and property tax rate is 0.76.
t2(supply) depicts the number of firms in the municipal given that the tax rates are known. t2
(demand) describes the property tax rate given the number of firms are known.
First Scenario: Beta=-1.5 vs Beta=-2.0
In our second scenario, we change the beta from -2.0 to -1.5. The changes in demand tax functions
and supply tax functions are shown in chart 2. If firms are less responsive to changes in tax rate,
the whole demand schedule will shift upwards. In addition, the gradient for the firms location
function becomes less steep. The original equilibrium, which is at Al, shifts to A2. The new
equilibrium commercial property tax is higher and the new equilibrium number of firms per capita
is lower.
Figure 14
Beta=-2 to Beta=-1.5
ICD I
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Note: The pre t2 are the tax rates with beta=-2, while t2 are tax rates derived with beta =-1.5.
Using our initial conditions, I found that the commercial property tax rates will fall as
number of firms increase (See Figure 14 ). A2 is the new equilibrium point and Al is the old
equilibrium.
The next question is to find how the equilibrium tax rates and number of firms will change
when income changes. We let income increases over time and observe how the equilibrium
changes. As shown below in Figure 15, we find that the whole demand function shifts upwards. The
equilibrium tax rate becomes higher and the equilibrium number of firms falls; the equilibrium
position shifted from B 1 to B2.
Figure 15: Changes in Income
Change in Income
New T2
(Demand
I-
Base T2 / .-Base T2
- -(Demand)
7. I ..... I ... .... ..... .
1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8
Number of Firms Per Capita
Base t2(Supply) ..... Base t2 (demand)
New t2 (Supply) New t2 (demand)
Note: The pre t2 are the tax rates with income=l, while t2 are tax rates derived income=1.5. The
chart shows that the demand function will shift upwards. The equilibrium position shifted from Al
to A2, signifying higher commercial property tax rates and fewer firms.
Given that high income municipals place a high value to environment, they have to rely less
on firms for external revenue. Hence, they will increase commercial tax rates to "drive" the firms
away. In addition, the increase in come means higher demand of public services. Residential tax
rates will too have to increase as the residents consume more services.
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Proposition 1:
Municipals with greater number of firms will impose a high commercial property tax rate,
as long as assumptions (1) and (2) are met. From Chart 1, we see that commercial property tax rate
is upwards sloping until assumption (2) is violated.
Proposition 2:
High income earning municipals that are adverse to firms will impose high commercial
property tax rates, as they try to not to rely on firms to produce services. The number of firms will
fall. This is depicted in Chart 3. The demand function increases, while the supply function is
unaffected by changes in income.
Corollary 2a:
From Proposition 1, we know that municipals with high-income households will impose a
higher commercial tax rate that that of municipals with low-income households. The increase in tax
rates will discourage firms to locate in the municipal. We know that the residential property tax is
provided by the following function,
tl + t2 1(1 - b) = bY
Differentiating the above with respect to Y, we get
at, = b -t2 (1 - b) 1 - t2 al
Using the assumption in (7) as seen below and Proposition (2)
1 + t2 l' < 0, (7)
at, must be more than 0. Hence, high income municipals will impose a high residential property
tax rate, and the difference in rates for rich municipals is smaller than that for poor municipals.
4.5 Empirical test
I assembled the property tax rates, levy from the yearly publications of Massachusetts
Taxpayers Association (MTA) and Department of Revenue of Massachusetts. I use the effective tax
rates- rates based on Equalized Valuations by the department. Note that the actual tax rates are
usually higher than the effective tax rates before 1981 because the valuations were usually lower
than Equalized Valuations. Given that the Department of Revenue only provides information from
1980 onwards, I have to depend on the publications by MTA. Some of the early publications like
the tax rates on 1974 was missing in the library and cannot be accounted. In addition, for some
small municipals, information is not available and they are omitted from study. The series provided
by Department of Revenue have missing information on the levies collected. I used the rates from
MTA and the equalized valuations that stretched back to 1970 to derive the levies collected. I
compared the levies collected in the MTA and those I derive and the differences are not large.
The wage and employment data is obtained from are obtained from the Department of Labor
and Workforce of Massachusetts. It contains employment and wages in establishments in each of
the 351 cities and towns in the Commonwealth. In other words, the wage does not represent the
income of residents but what offered by firms in the municipals. In addition, the wage I took is the
average wage for all establishments, including non-profit organizations and public sector. It is noted
that no-profit organizations and public sector institutions do not pay property taxes. The results will
be better reflect the interactions if we use private sector employment and wages, or the employment
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and wages for the detailed industries. Nevertheless, most of the information is subject to certain
restrictions to protect the confidentiality of all data reported by individual employers. Summary
level dad is confidential if there are less than three reporting units in total, or if with three or more
units, one unit accounts for 80% or more of the total.
Using the published numbers for establishments is problematic- the number of
establishments includes subsidiaries of firms and other related companies and companies
sometimes use the establishment for tax rebates purposes. Hence, we use the employment base as a
proxy for the number of firms.
4.1 Presence offirms on property tax rates
Our tests comprise of several fixed effect tests and Difference-In-Difference tests. In our
first set of empirical tests, we wanted to know whether municipals with more firms will vote for
higher commercial tax rates or not. This is our test for the first proposition. We first study the
difference in tax rates using the panel of observations. In addition, we use a probit test to examine
the characteristics of the municipals that selected the classified property tax system. It is interesting
to note that the municipals that preferred the multi-tax regime never revert back to the uniform tax
system.
For our panel tests, our dependent variable is the difference between commercial tax rate
and residential tax rate. The dependent variables are the employment of the jurisdiction lagged one
period and the difference in rates lagged on period. We ran a total of 6 tests. For the first three
tests, we only use the post 81 dat. This is because the difference in rates is 0 before 1981, and this
may generate bias in the results. In the latter three tests, we utilize the whole sample to test the
relationship. Besides splitting the sample by time period, we also run different specification of the
tests. We had tests with fixed effects for municipal and year, fixed effects for year only and no
fixed effects. When the municipal fixed effects are included, the effect of employment per capita on
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property tax rates differences is reduced. This is because the differences in employment may be
captured by the municipal fixed effects.
The results are presented in table 4.1. The results are very consistent across the different
specifications we used. We found that the difference in tax rates are persistent- a high difference in
property tax rates in previous period is likely to lead to an even higher difference in current period.
The total employment per capita in the previous period has a positive effect on the current
difference in rates. The results show support to our theory; municipals with large number of firms
tend to impose a high commercial tax rate. Looking at the results for the post 81 data with year
fixed effects only specification, we found that the difference in property tax rates will drop by 7.2%
if the employment per capita drops by 100.
Table 11: Panel Fixed Effects Test
Dependent Variable: Difference in Property tax rates (Commercial tax rate - Residential tax rates)
Test with Test with Test Test with Test with Test
year and year without year and year without
municipal Fixed fixed municipal Fixed year fixed
fixed Effect Effects fixed Effect Effect
effects using post using post effects using using
using post 81data 81data using whole whole
81data whole sample sample
sample
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Difference in 0.7088138 0.95581 0.9516873 .8609834 0.9578126 0.9557697
Property tax (108.76) (274.41) (274.11) (193.79) (316.23) (320.32)
rates lagged
Employment 0.361157 0.713308 0.6717275 .5214304 0.6114604 0.6157899
per capita (2.05) (10.60) (9.93) (4.37) (11.16) (11.33)
Lag 1
Constant -0.190418 0.4843385 -0.0107785 -.1247075 -
(-0.70) (6.04) ( -0.42) ( -0.55) 0.0828233 0.0300367
. _1~ ~_rl_;__ 1~~;/1;11__--1(1_---._-1-...._
( -1.15) (-1.57)
R-square 0.9247 0.9085 0.9069 0.9196 0.9135 0.9118
Alternatively, we ran a probit test. The dependent variable is the choice of whether the municipal
has selected multiple-tax regime or not as in 1990. Included in the independent variables are the
employment per capita in 1990 and the average household income of each municipal in 1990. The
results are reported in Table 4.2.
Table 12: Dependent Variable: Choice of Tax Regime (1-dual tax regime,0- universal tax regime)
Coefficient Standard T stat Pvalue 95% confidential level
deviation
Median -0.000018 6.90e-06 -2.54 0.011 -.000031 -3.99e-06
Household
Income 1989
Employment 3.002607 .5497244 5.46 0.000 1.925167 4.080047
per capita
1990
Constant -0.160275 .4128947 -0.39 0.698 -.9695344 .6489831
We found that municipals with high median household income are less likely to choose the
dual tax regime, and municipals with high employment per capita are more likely to choose the dual
tax regime. The results are consistent when we shift the cross-section to other years. The probit test
provides much support to our results. First, municipals that have higher income residents place
more importance (value) to the environment. Hence, they have to charge a high residential property
tax rate as they want to rely less on the firms, while enjoying a high level of services. Low income
municipals, alternatively, have to rely on firms to provide fiscal benefits. The only way for the
residents to enjoy such fiscal benefits is to adopt the property tax classification system. Second, the
coefficient for employment is consistent to the results we had in the panel tests. When municipals
select the dual tax system, the municipals will charge the commercial properties at a rate higher
than the residential property tax rate. Hence, with larger employment per capita, there will be more
firms, attracting a higher commercial property tax rate.
4.2 Commercial Property tax rates on employment per capita
The second set of tests examines whether the firms' location decision function in our model
is justifiable. Dye et al. (2001) argues that changes in the classification tax system have
insignificant effect on economic development. With a larger number of cross-section observations
and longer time series, we conduct the tests that are similar to the first set. The dependent variable
is the lagged change in employment and the independent variables are the lagged changes in
employment and lagged difference in tax rates. Note that the fixed effects of municipals removed a
lot of explanatory power.
The panel results show that the change in employment per capita falls after the difference in
property tax rates widened. Using level variables, we get the same results when we accounted for
the year and municipal fixed effects. The results support a downward sloping firm location
function that contributes to our propositions.
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Table 13: Dependent Variable: Chanae in Emulovment Per Capita
Fixed Fixed Effects Pooled Fixed Fixed Pooled
Effects (year and Regression Effects Effects Regression
(year) municipal) (No fixed (year) (year and (No fixed
using post using post effects) using municipal) effects)
1981 data 1981 data using post whole using using
1981 data sample whole whole
sample sample
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Change in -.0704006 -.0929076 -.0440589 -.054094 -.0786629 -.0283833
Employment (-7.32) (-9.52) ( -4.68) -(5.78) (-8.31) (-3.04)
per capita
lagged 1
period
Difference in -.0002331 -.0006042 -.0002005 -.0002302 -.001067 -.0005162
property tax (-2.63) (-3.10 ) (-2.24) (-2.37) (-6.52) (-5.31)
rates lagged
Constant .0060902 -.0039234 .0032615 0048096 -.0035089 .0069929
(2.76) (-0.49) (6.87) (2.00) (-0.44) (14.98)
R-square 0.0475 0.0784 0.0028 0.0744 0.1029 0.0032
Note: Values in parenthesis are t-values.
Table 14:Dependent Variable: Employment per Capita
Fixed Fixed Effects Pooled Fixed Fixed Effects Pooled
Effects (year and Regressio Effects (year and Regressio
(year municipal)usin n using (year municipal)usin n using
)using g using post using post )using g whole whole
post 1981 1981 data 1981 data whole sample sample
data sample
Coefficien Coefficient Coefficien Coefficien Coefficient Coefficien
t t t t
Employmen .9896879 .8465181 .9884476 .9944602 .8974636 .990705
t per capita (534.97) (168.65) (525.55) (540.22) (224.21) (529.13)
lagged 1
period
Difference -.0000159 -.0005534 .0000441 -.0001096 -.0006457 -.0002709
in property (-0.17) ( -2.97) (0.46) (-1.07) (-4.32) (-2.63)
tax rates
lagged
Constant .0052566 .0389616 .0063364 -.0016737 .0314663 .0088995
(2.38) (4.99) (8.82) (-0.69) (4.13) (13.43)
R-square 10.9732 0.9763 0.9720 0.9670 0.9695 0.9646
Note: Values in parenthesis are t-values
I further conduct Difference-in-Difference test, examining how the employment per capita
changes after the law allowed the municipals to vote the tax system they want. Before the change in
tax regime is allowed, "treated" municipals- those that select multiple tax regimes after 1981- chose
has a growth rate of 7.2%. "Untreated" Municipals- municipals that do not opt for dual tax regimes
after 1981- have a growth rate of 3.7%. After 1981, those municipals that selected the multiple tax
regimes have a growth rate of 3.7%. Alternatively, municipals that continued the existing tax
regime have a growth rate of 4.7%. The results provide strong evidence that the increase in
commercial tax rates reduces the employment growth rate and hence, the growth rate in number of
firms.
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Table 15
Window period- from 1970-1978 and 1982-1991
Dependent variable: Absolute Change in employment per capita
Coefficient Standard T stat Pvalue 95% confidential level
deviation
Post -.046132 .0155838 -2.96 0.003 -.0767292 -.0155348
Treatment
Treatment .0353707 .0110161 3.21 0.001 .0137417 .0569997
Post 0.0104364 .0084721 1.23 0.218 -.0061977 .0270705
Constant .0377864 .0059846 6.31 0.000 .0260363 .0495365
Rsquare 0.0163
4.6 Conclusion
Property tax classification system provides us an opportunity to study why municipals want
to impose high property tax rates on commercial properties. The past studies approach the problem
using Mieszkowski's approach, arguing that the tax rate differentials are passed to consumers from
other jurisdictions or landowners. Even then, the theory could not explain why commercial
properties are charged a higher tax rate than residential tax rate across the board. A second group of
studies postulate that the fiscal benefits entice the population to impose a high tax rate on
commercial properties. Nevertheless, that depends on the elasticity of firms' decision with respect
to tax.
Instead of viewing the commercial property tax rate as a capital tax, we consider the
commercial property tax as a payment to compensate for the negative externalities. We adopt this
view because it is unlikely people stay in the same jurisdiction as they work. In addition, we model
the firms' location decision using a logistic function. Using the above assumptions, we create a
model to explain the phenomenon. We found that households that value the environment more will
rely on themselves to provide better services. They will tax commercial firms more- not to increase
their fiscal benefits but to enjoy better environment. Alternatively, for poor municipals who has
less regard to the negative externalities the firm produces, they will try to attract firms to increase
their fiscal savings. Hence, the difference in tax rates will fall. Our empirical tests show that
demand for less reliance on firms is a strong explanatory variable on the differences in tax rates. In
addition, we further show evidence that firms is adverse to high commercial property tax rates.
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Chapter 5 Conclusion
The thesis aims to address three questions:
a) what is the theory that drives the co-movement between price and sales in housing market?
b) Is the housing market efficient and whether bargains are available or not?
c) Why do some municipals charge commercial properties at a rate higher than that for
residential properties?
Given that the time series for data on housing and real estate markets are short, the use of
panel data analysis techniques enable us to answer the above questions and develop new
theories in the field. For the first question, we found a gap in the existing literature on co-
movements of price and sales in housing market. Past studies fail to capture the inter-tenure
transitions that represent 60% of the transactions. Further examination of the data shows that
such inter-tenure transitions create a negative schedule between sales and price via inventory.
The use of the panel data analysis further provides strong empirical support to our model. The
finding has important policy implications. It shows that by increasing the affordability of rent-
to-own households, the housing market can recover.
The second question has garnered lots of interest since 1980s, when housing market was
booming. Under the user cost model, locations that at priced highly (lowly) will enjoy high
(low) appreciation if the market is efficient. While many empirical studies have been done to
check the efficiency of the market, my study is one of the first few that made use a panel data at
zip code level within the Metropolitan Statistical Area. The database enabled us to leave out
other possible reasons that could cause the same phenomenon. We found that the housing
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markets in Boston, San Diego, and Phoenix efficient, prompting us to conclude that "bargains"
are unlikely be found. Alternatively, the results show Chicago housing market is inefficient,
implying opportunities of arbitrage. Nevertheless, I believe the result in Chicago housing
market could be resulted from the flight of firms from the center to the suburbs. Much research
needs to be done to ascertain whether this is true.
The last question has drawn much attention across States as they look at different ways to
increase funding for local services. One of the ways is to tax commercial property and
residential properties at different rates. Studies have been fast to point out that such system will
cause commercial property tax rate rise and residential tax rate fall. We took an extra step to
find why certain jurisdictions will impose a high property tax rate for commercial properties and
low tax rate for residential properties. Unlike past studies, we adopt Fischel (1975) framework-
treating commercial property tax as compensation for the externalities the firms create. This is
because few work in the same jurisdiction they live. I develop a model of firm location choice
and residents' choice of tax rates. I found that rich neighborhoods tend to impose high
commercial tax rates and high residential tax rates. This is because they wanted to deter the
firms from locating in their neighborhood and reduce the reliance the revenue from them. In
addition, the model suggests jurisdictions with large number of firms are likely to impose higher
commercial property tax rates. From the panel database I assembled, the results strongly support
the model. The empirical results and theory has important policy implications. First, the poor
municipals need the firms to reduce their tax burden. Hence, their tax rates on commercial
properties will be lower than those imposed by rich municipals. Second, DiMasi (1988) has
shown that the multiple tax rate system is likely to generate less welfare. In this case, it seems
that the rates in rich jurisdictions are unlikely to lose much welfare when they switch to
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property classification tax system because their rates do not differ much. Those staying in the
poor jurisdictions, however, may suffer greater loss of welfare when they opt for the property
tax classification system.
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APPENDIX 2.1: Sales, Price Panel Statistics
Market Market Average Average Average Average
Code GRRHPI GREMP SFSALES GRSALES
(%) (%) RATE RATE (%)
1 Allentown* 2.03 1.10 4.55 4.25
2 Akron 1.41 1.28 4.79 4.96
3 Albuquerque 0.59 2.79 5.86 7.82
4 Atlanta 1.22 3.18 4.31 5.47
5 Austin 0.65 4.23 4.36 4.86
6 Bakersfield* 0.68 1.91 5.40 3.53
7 Baltimore* 2.54 1.38 3.55 4.27
8 Baton Rouge -0.73 1.77 3.73 5.26
9 Beaumont -1.03 0.20 2.75 4.76
10 Bellingham* 2.81 3.68 3.71 8.74
11 Birmingham 1.28 1.61 4.02 5.53
12 Boulder 2.43 2.54 5.23 3.45
13 Boise City 0.76 3.93 5.23 6.88
14 Boston MA* 5.02 0.95 2.68 4.12
15 Buffalo 1.18 0.71 3.79 2.71
16 Canton 1.02 0.79 4.20 4.07
17 Chicago IL 2.54 1.29 4.02 6.38
18 Charleston 1.22 2.74 3.34 6.89
19 Charlotte 1.10 3.02 3.68 5.56
20 Cincinnati 1.09 1.91 4.87 4.49
21 Cleveland 1.37 0.77 3.90 4.79
22 Columbus 1.19 2.15 5.66 4.61
23 Corpus Christi -1.15 0.71 3.42 3.88
24 Columbia 0.80 2.24 3.22 5.99
25 Colorado Springs 1.20 3.37 5.38 5.50
Dallas-Fort Worth-
26 Arlington -0.70 2.49 4.26 4.64
27 Dayton OH 1.18 0.99 4.21 4.40
28 Daytona Beach 1.86 3.06 4.77 5.59
29 Denver CO 1.61 1.96 4.07 5.81
30 Des Moines 1.18 2.23 6.11 5.64
31 Detroit MI 2.45 1.42 4.16 3.76
32 Flint 1.70 0.06 4.14 3.35
33 Fort Collins 2.32 3.63 5.82 6.72
34 Fresno CA* 1.35 2.04 4.69 6.08
35 Fort Wayne 0.06 1.76 4.16 7.73
36 Grand Rapids MI 1.59 2.49 5.21 1.09
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37 Greensboro NC 0.96 1.92 2.95 7.22
38 Harrisburg PA 0.56 1.69 4.24 3.45
39 Honolulu 3.05 1.28 2.99 12.66
40 Houston -1.27 1.38 3.95 4.53
41 Indianapolis IN 0.82 2.58 4.37 6.17
42 Jacksonville 1.42 2.96 4.60 7.23
43 Kansas City 0.70 1.66 5.35 5.17
44 Lansing 1.38 1.24 4.45 1.37
45 Lexington 0.67 2.43 6.23 3.25
46 Los Angeles CA* 3.51 0.99 2.26 5.40
47 Louisville 1.48 1.87 4.65 4.53
48 Little Rock 0.21 2.22 4.64 4.63
49 Las Vegas 1.07 6.11 5.11 8.14
50 Memphis 0.46 2.51 4.63 5.75
51 Miami FL 1.98 2.93 3.21 6.94
52 Milwaukee 1.90 1.24 2.42 5.16
53 Minneapolis 2.16 2.20 4.39 4.35
54 Modesto* 2.81 2.76 5.54 7.04
55 Napa* 4.63 3.27 4.35 5.32
56 Nashville 1.31 2.78 4.44 6.38
57 New York* 4.61 0.72 2.34 1.96
58 New Orleans 0.06 0.52 2.94 4.80
59 Ogden 0.67 3.25 4.22 6.08
60 Oklahoma City -1.21 0.95 5.17 3.66
61 Omaha 0.65 2.03 4.99 4.35
62 Orlando 0.88 5.21 5.30 6.33
63 Ventura* 3.95 2.61 4.19 5.83
64 Peoria 0.38 1.16 4.31 6.93
65 Philadelphia PA* 2.78 1.18 3.52 2.57
66 Phoenix 1.05 4.41 4.27 7.49
67 Pittsburgh 1.18 0.69 2.86 2.75
68 Portland* 2.52 2.61 4.17 7.05
69 Providence* 4.82 0.96 2.83 4.71
70 Port St. Lucie 1.63 3.59 5.60 7.18
71 Raleigh NC 1.15 3.91 4.06 5.42
72 Reno 1.55 2.94 3.94 8.60
73 Richmond 1.31 2.04 4.71 3.60
74 Riverside* 2.46 4.55 6.29 5.80
75 Rochester 0.61 0.80 5.16 1.01
76 Santa Rosa* 4.19 3.06 4.90 2.80
77 Sacramento* 3.02 3.32 5.51 4.94
78 San Francisco CA* 4.23 1.09 2.61 4.73
102
I 1 - . , - - 1 -, - - 1 1 - 11 - , - - -- - l I l - - " , - " - , - ,-- - - , -. , ; - - - - - - - -
79 Salinas* 4.81 1.55 3.95 5.47
80 San Antonio -1.03 2.45 3.70 5.52
81 Sarasota 2.29 4.25 4.69 7.30
82 Santa Barbara* 4.29 1.42 3.16 4.27
83 Santa Cruz* 4.34 2.60 3.19 3.24
84 San Diego* 4.13 2.96 3.62 5.45
85 Seattle* 2.97 2.65 2.95 8.10
86 San Jose* 4.34 1.20 2.85 4.55
87 Salt Lake City 1.39 3.12 3.45 5.72
88 St. Louis 1.48 1.40 4.55 4.82
89 San Luis Obispo* 4.18 3.32 5.49 4.27
90 Spokane* 1.52 2.28 2.81 9.04
91 Stamford* 3.64 0.60 3.14 4.80
92 Stockton* 2.91 2.42 5.59 5.99
93 Tampa 1.45 3.48 3.64 5.61
94 Toledo 0.65 1.18 4.18 5.18
95 Tucson 1.50 2.96 3.32 8.03
96 Tulsa -0.96 1.00 4.66 4.33
97 Vallejo CA* 3.48 2.87 5.24 5.41
98 Washington DC* 3.01 2.54 4.47 3.26
99 Wichita -0.47 1.43 5.01 4.39
100 Winston 0.73 1.98 2.92 5.51
101 Worcester* 4.40 1.13 4.18 5.77
Notes: Table provides the average real price appreciation over mne ~3
average job growth rate, average sales rate, and growth in sales rate.
* Denotes "Costal city" in robustness tests.
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APPENDIX 2.2
Let APT = [AP,,,.... API, ] 'and AsT = [ASl,,.... ASV ] ', where N is the number of markets. Let
Wr = [e, APT 1, As-1, AX , ] be the vector of right hand side variables, where e is a vector of ones.
Let VT = [E1T ,..,NTr ] be the Nx 1 vector of transformed disturbance terms. Let
B = [aO,a,, a 2,p , 1]' be the vector of coefficients for the equation.
Therefore,
ApT = WTB +VT (1)
Combining all the observations for each time period into a stack of equations, we have,
Ap = WB + V . (2)
The matrix of variables that qualify for instrumental variables in period T will be
ZT= [e, pT-_2 T-2, iA-2 ,T ], (3)
which changes with T.
To estimate B, we premultiply (2) by Z' to obtain
Z' Ap = Z'WB + Z' V . (4)
We then form a consistent instrumental variables estimator by applying GLS to equation (4), where
the covariance matrix n = E{Z'VV' Z}. Q is not known and has to be estimated. We estimate (4)
for each time period and form the vector of residuals for each period and form a consistent
estimator, 2, for f2. B, the GLS estimator of the parameter vetor, is hence:
B = [W' Z() - 1 Z ' W]-1W' Z() - 1 Z ' Ap. (5)
The same procedure applies to the equation wherein Sales (S) are on the LHS.
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Appendix 3.1 Hedonics Equation
A) Boston Hedonic Price Regression (1998)
Dependent Variable: House price
lnsale Coef. t P>t sig coeff
Built 1960-
1980 -0.05026 -7.11 0 -0.05026
Built 1940-
1960 -0.13523 -16.09 0 -0.13523
Built 1900-
1940 -0.1662 -18.46 0 -0.1662
Built pre-
1900 -0.19206 -15.89 0 -0.19206
1 bedroom -0.12093 -3.78 0 -0.12093
2 bedrooms -0.06042 -4.29 0 -0.06042
3 bedrooms -0.00808 -0.66 0.507 0
4 bedrooms 0.005488 0.46 0.643 0
1 bath -0.20654 -16.47 0 -0.20654
1.5 bath -0.14318 -12.71 0 -0.14318
2 bath -0.16332 -13.98 0 -0.16332
2.5 bath -0.06041 -6.19 0 -0.06041
interior
square feet 0.000298 21.11 0 0.000298
sq. feet -1.32E-
squared 08 -5.58 0 -1.3E-08
Lot size 0.14155 13.27 0 0.14155
Lot size sq -0.01635 -8.98 0 -0.01635
regsco 0.015277 4.09 0 0.015277
density 0.041415 8.51 0 0.041415
Ln median
income 0.357986 2.16 0.031 0.357986
cons -2.95215 -2.95 0.003 -2.95215
R-Square= 0.7168
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B) Phoenix Hedonic Price Regression(1998)
Insale Coef. P>t| sig coeff
Built 1980-
1990 -0.0886 0 -0.0886
Built 1970-
1980 -0.14813 0 -0.14813
Built 1960-
1970 -0.20073 0 -0.20073
Built
before
1960 -0.2527 0 -0.2527
1 bathroom -0.11637 0 -0.11637
1.5
bathroom -0.12147 0 -0.12147
2 bath
rooms -0.05861 0 -0.05861
2.5
bathrooms -0.02484 0 -0.02484
3bathrooms -0.00131 0.814 0
5-room -0.00331 0.709 0
6-room -0.02291 0.037 -0.02291
7-room -0.0511 0 -0.0511
Room8- -0.08753 0 -0.08753
Interior Sq
Feet 0.0006 0 0.0006
Interior Sq -4.42E-
feet Square 08 0 -4.4E-08
Lot Size 0.260908 0 0.260908
Lot Size Sq -0.02199 0.001 -0.02199
Pool 0.052737 0 0.052737
Garage 0.057881 0 0.057881
Density -0.00434 0.511 0
Ln Median
Income 0.011572 0.901 0
Constant 11.18304 0 11.18304
R-Square= 0.776
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C) San Diego Price Regression (1998)
Insale Coef. P>It sig coef
built80 0.009864 0.45 0
built70 -0.09978 0 -0.09978
built60 -0.09502 0 -0.09502
builtp60 -0.0653 0.001 -0.0653
bedl 0.076764 0.177 0
bed2 0.033985 0.085 0.033985
bed3 0.052283 0.001 0.052283
bed4 0.032621 0.02 0.032621
bathl -0.0742 0.015 -0.0742
bathl5 -0.06265 0.059 -0.06265
bath2 -0.01135 0.667 0
bath25 -0.03225 0.188 0
bath3 -0.02204 0.344 0
sqft 0.000467 0 0.000467
-2.58E-
sqftsq 08 0 -2.6E-08
-1.46E-
lotszsq 06 0.847 0
lotsize 0.001165 0.734 0
garage 0.135294 0 0.135294
pool 0.076756 0 0.076756
density 0.00358 0.284 0
Inmedinc 0.85806 0 0.85806
cons 2.262603 0.001 2.262603
R-Square= 0.6994
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D) Chicago Hedonic Regression (1998)
Insale Coef. P>t| sig coeff
built after
1980 0.195267 0 0.195267
built 1970-
1980 0.124359 0 0.124359
Built
1970-60 0.078294 0 0.078294
Built
1960-1970 0.033203 0 0.033203
1
Bathroom -0.27247 0 -0.27247
1.5
Bathrooms -0.21495 0 -0.21495
2
Bathrooms -0.19741 0 -0.19741
2.5
Bathrooms -0.14139 0 -0.14139
3
Bathrooms -0.11663 0.004 -0.11663
Interior Sq
feet 0.00036 0 0.00036
Interior Sq
feet -2.60E-
Square 08 0 -2.6E-08
Lot Size 0.381877 0 0.381877
Lot Size
Sq -0.0505 0 -0.0505
density 0.025079 0 0.025079
nonwhite -0.96735 0 -0.96735
cons 11.77202 0 11.77202
R-square = 0.6372
109
Appendix 3.2
Estimation of Rhos
Chicago Boston
std Std
zip rho deviation zip rho deviation
60004 0.048611 -0.2268 1460 0.146566 -0.3752
60007 -0.08801 -0.3377 1532 -0.14064 -0.712
-5.67E-
60008 -0.05092 -0.1896 1581 08 -0.383
60016 0.092494 -0.1198 1701 0.108319 -0.5193
60025 0.032324 -0.35 1702 0.254682 -0.4124
60056 0.032324 0.0089 1719 0.3525 -0.2744
60062 0.131688 0.0619 1720 0.358005 -0.349
60067 -0.06284 -0.3829 1721 0.184879 -0.5264
60068 0.169501 0.687 1730 0.490579 -0.3903
60076 0.415859 -0.02 1741 0.06545 -0.4564
60090 -0.15164 -0.1208 1742 0.689924 0.0439
60091 0.33202 -0.2525 1746 0.293363 -0.486
60103 0.158114 -0.3659 1747 0.363329 -0.0325
60107 0.177947 -0.2378 1748 0.211327 -0.2582
60193 -0.137 -0.4917 1752 0.139121 -0.4379
60194 0.093376 -0.2411 1757 0.355482 0.0567
60195 0.088855 -0.302 1760 0.37052 -0.4152
60201 0.432982 -0.3046 1770 0.296614 -0.3547
60302 0.265567 -0.2612 1772 0.01312 -0.6093
60402 0.224017 0.1174 1773 0.483241 -0.572
60430 0.524584 -0.1101 1776 0.36285 -0.1775
60438 0.407394 -0.3561 1778 0.42361 -0.3491
60445 0.664648 0.2258 1801 -0.02617 -0.2153
60452 0.36051 -0.3487 1803 0.479275 -0.182
60459 0.527129 0.2227 1810 0.088643 -0.5361
60462 0.303743 -0.3147 1824 0.081071 -0.3905
60477 0.478473 -0.1746 1843 0.456403 -0.4672
60521 0.365061 0.0937 1844 0.290716 -0.3762
60525 -0.11994 -0.388 1845 0.094984 -0.2466
60618 0.394281 -0.0711 1850 0.492241 -0.2137
60620 -0.00288 -0.1334 1851 0.542552 -0.2919
60625 0.346792 -0.2329 1852 0.543744 -0.3503
60629 0.6299 0.2592 1854 0.535427 -0.2764
60630 0.141456 -0.5705 1862 0.200481 -0.2924
60631 0.272147 0.3063 1864 0.066686 -0.4374
60632 0.297605 -0.131 1867 0.122867 -0.3155
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Chicago Boston
std Std
zip rho deviation zip rho deviation
60634 0.043618 -0.3188 1876 0.02212 -0.3016
-3.71E-
60638 0.407027 -0.0829 1880 06 -0.431
60639 0.890088 0.0525 1886 0.05403 -0.2758
60640 0.51791 0.0858 1887 0.220483 -0.072
60641 0.87808 0.1713 1890 -0.21493 -0.4835
60645 0.492665 0.0239 1904 0.435805 -0.3608
60646 0.220697 -0.4814 1905 0.430105 -0.4197
60647 0.654336 -0.0185 1906 0.093499 -0.4434
60649 0.111736 -0.0111 1907 -0.02971 -0.4686
60652 0.559695 0.1167 1915 -0.20751 -0.4624
60655 0.357254 -0.0803 1921 -0.26375 -0.4472
60656 -0.263 -0.5569 1923 -0.22053 -0.3879
60659 0.44887 -0.0643 1940 -0.07179 -0.5552
1945 -0.36572 -0.5748
1960 -0.05747 -0.5169
1970 0.175351 -0.3639
1983 -0.12863 -0.5332
2019 0.683471 0.2886
2025 0.117491 -0.2387
2026 -0.27677 -0.8183
2030 -0.15028 -0.265
2035 0.448787 -0.3262
2038 0.510869 -0.1835
2045 -0.08283 -0.5645
2053 0.322168 -0.4034
2054 0.510805 -0.251
2056 0.318303 -0.419
2062 -0.41902 -0.5932
2067 0.285696 -0.3552
2072 0.393808 -0.1077
2081 0.079075 -0.5905
2093 0.630422 0.0699
2124 0.548664 -0.2528
2126 0.383723 -0.3164
2131 0.239554 -0.4592
2132 -0.35573 -0.8064
2136 0.259943 -0.3317
2140 0.118145 -0.5349
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Boston
Std
zip rho deviation
1876 0.02212 -0.3016
2149 0.367784 -0.5034
2155 0.123323 -0.4882
2169 0.62796 -0.1304
2170 0.378005 -0.3476
2171 0.04049 -0.7303
2176 -0.22261 -0.5753
2180 -0.24702 -0.5765
2184 0.624568 0.0106
2186 0.280834 -0.5063
2343 0.454607 -0.368
2368 0.451192 -0.338
2420 0.43438 -0.4771
2421 0.500384 -0.4405
2445 -0.32986 -0.3987
2451 0.354868 -0.4878
2452 -0.00656 -0.761
2453 0.456466 -0.3778
2458 0.257591 -0.5663
2459 0.40158 -0.4256
2460 0.435922 -0.5738
2461 0.689296 -0.1327
2465 0.505042 -0.6212
2472 0.273476 0.377
2476 0.26875 -0.2661
2478 0.075171 -0.482
2481 0.554466 -0.2635
2482 0.403213 -0.3269
2492 0.644959 -0.1906
2493 0.500609 -0.3539
2494 0.598435 -0.2175
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i
Phoenix San Diego
std
zip rho deviation zip rho Std Deviation
85003 0.39254 -0.6493 92065 0.215272 -0.3582
85006 0.268164 -0.7713 92131 0.104271 -0.1402
85007 0.066254 -0.6559 92129 -0.05869 -0.5524
85008 0.274727 -0.1764 92130 0.178116 -0.3139
85009 0.141134 -0.2891 92056 0.250375 -0.2143
85013 0.015599 -0.6646 92127 -0.08271 -0.5437
85014 -0.4197 -0.7427 92082 0.040015 -0.2781
85015 0.084183 -0.608 92064 0.021091 -0.3073
85016 0.281585 -0.5888 92019 0.08729 -0.2904
85017 0.09509 -0.4141 92128 0.394091 -0.2922
85018 -0.09609 -0.5995 92126 0.095368 -0.5086
85019 0.145434 -0.2707 92026 0.22069 -0.2433
85020 0.316775 -0.1634 92009 0.318531 -3.58E-01
85021 0.547019 -1.60E-03 92139 0.110018 -0.326
85022 0.643009 0.0999 92071 0.312465 -0.0807
85023 0.042151 -0.2227 92027 -0.03829 -0.3907
85024 0.404535 -0.0113 92114 0.151272 -0.3881
85027 0.491612 0.5986 92040 0.245662 -0.3119
85028 0.141711 -0.3827 92028 -0.13326 -0.3293
85029 0.301491 -0.1011 92083 0.086667 -0.2413
85031 0.143182 -0.2521 92084 0.173276 0.0356
85032 0.479644 0.0495 92154 0.255318 -0.0914
85033 0.368969 -0.102 92124 0.027316 -0.5508
85035 0.174849 -0.3495 92119 -0.05619 -0.434
85037 0.128464 -0.1903 92069 0.005387 -0.4243
85040 0.151643 -0.2779 92120 -0.03749 -0.4243
85041 0.034916 -0.361 92123 0.428613 -0.2153
85043 0.028465 -0.2166 92014 0.337878 -0.4111
85044 0.350704 -0.2431 92024 0.169606 -0.2844
85048 0.370531 0.1757 92025 -0.28027 -0.6085
85050 0.307235 -0.1289 92021 0.209972 -0.4419
85051 0.34648 -0.0209 92008 -0.19169 -0.5263
85053 0.180449 0.0347 92007 -0.07142 -0.5276
85201 0.006612 -0.3206 92117 -0.23493 -0.7751
85202 -0.10424 -0.504 92020 -0.15139 -0.5764
85203 -0.13484 -0.4828 92111 0.038558 -0.5445
85204 -0.31658 -0.586 92122 -0.17415 -0.5944
85205 -0.09911 -0.818 92075 0.02309 -0.512
85206 -0.1438 -0.671 92116 -0.07402 -0.6058
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Phoenix San Diego
std
zip rho deviation zip rho Std Deviation
85207 0.67333 -0.134 92104 0.029577 -0.5645
85208 0.194965 -0.406 92107 0.197752 -0.3628
85210 0.14067 -0.1402 92103 -0.10906 -0.5376
85213 0.230783 -0.5629 Phoenix
85215 0.3071 -0.1548 zip rho std deviation
85220 0.113442 -0.1736 85353 0.208344 0.1216
85224 -0.0301 -0.405 85363 0.754341 0.0357
85225 -0.05273 -0.5287 85373 0.713871 '  -0.2103
85226 0.119584 -0.4815 85374 0.238065 0.3001
85233 0.627211 0.1785 85375 0.89958 0.7127
85234 0.383948 -0.4632 85382 0.890297 0.6528
85242 0.096535 -0.3492
85248 0.476103 -0.0657
85249 0.094162 -0.3157
85250 0.302333 -0.3067
85251 0.447871 -0.1847
85254 0.376367 -0.091
85255 0.100586 -0.3553
85257 0.509044 -0.3276
85258 0.257615 -0.1271
85259 0.032463 -0.1467
85260 0.232409 -0.2502
85268 0.115723 -0.2
85281 0.780484 0.0009
85282 0.364922 -0.4778
85283 -0.00892 -0.3143
85284 -0.30106 -0.1369
85296 0.159502 -0.4182
85301 0.2301 -0.2181
85302 0.185275 -0.3729
85303 0.197384 -0.2725
85304 0.476978 -0.3496
85305 -0.0788 -0.1495
85306 0.709495 -0.0371
85308 0.694061 -0.3243
85310 0.808134 0.6545
85331 0.401163 -0.0069
85345 0.442559 -0.5326
85351 0.769993 0.584
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